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TURKEY’S ACCESSION TO THE CISG: 
THE SIGNIFICANCE FOR TURKEY 
AND FOR SALES TRANSACTIONS 
WITH U.S. CONTRACTING PARTIES 
 
 
William P. Johnson* 
 
Abstract 
 
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(CISG) entered into force for Turkey on August 1, 2011.  This article considers the 
significance of Turkey’s accession to the CISG as part of Turkey’s continuing 
engagement with systems of international trade, especially as relates to sales 
transactions with U.S. contracting parties.  This article urges the Turkish bar to 
recognize that the CISG is a viable alternative to various potentially applicable bodies of 
domestic sales law, and the article offers some guidance regarding proper understanding 
and application of the CISG.  This article also offers comparative analysis of some of the 
most important differences – and similarities – between the CISG and Article 2 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, the primary domestic sales law in force in the United States, 
including analysis of the broad freedom of contract contained in each. 
Keywords:  CISG, freedom of contract, international sales law, international 
trade, Uniform Commercial Code 
INTRODUCTION 
“Turkey is at a crossroads.”1 So claimed Eric Rouleau in 1996 in the context of 
analyzing the challenges presented by Turkey’s management of its domestic conflict with 
the Kurdish Workers’ Party, its joining of the European Customs Union, and its evolving 
relationship with the United States following the fall of the Iron Curtain.2  Some fifteen 
years later, the crossroads remains, at least in some respects. 
Significantly, although Turkey entered into a customs union with the European 
Union in 1995, it continues to feel its way along the path to EU membership.  Turkey 
obtained status as an EU candidate country more than ten years ago (in December 1999) 
and entered formal accession negotiations more than five years ago (in October 2005), 
but it is not yet an EU member state.3  While Turkey has made progress toward EU 
                                               
* William P. Johnson (B.A. in German, University of Minnesota; J.D., University of Michigan Law 
School) is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of North Dakota School of Law in the United 
States.  He is grateful to Jan Stone for her valuable support of this article. 
1 Eric Rouleau, Turkey: Beyond Atatürk, FOREIGN POL’Y, Summer 1996, at 70, 70. 
2 See id. at 71-87. 
3 See European Commission, Commission Staff, Turk. 2010 Progress Rep. accompany’g the Commc’n 
from the Comm’n to the Eur. Parl. & the Council – Enlargement Strategy & Main Challenges 2010-2011, 
§ 1.2, SEC(2010) 1327 (Nov. 9, 2010) [hereinafter Turkey 2010 Progress Report]. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1947587
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membership, it still has work to do, and it experiences setbacks from time to time, some 
of its own making.4   
The recent arrest of members of the Turkish press who are associated with the 
opposition in Turkey is one troubling example of a setback.5  While Turkish prosecutors 
have asserted that the journalists are involved in criminal attempts to overthrow the 
government (through the organization Ergenekon), critics claim that that is merely a 
pretext for politically motivated oppression by the government.6  In fact, the UN Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights issued a statement criticizing the lack of 
transparency in the arrests, and expressing concern that the arrests might be politically 
motivated and constitute a violation of international law.7  Such setbacks hinder Turkey’s 
full participation in international legal systems, including those relating to international 
trade and commerce.  Nevertheless, on balance Turkey appears resolved to continue to 
proceed down the path of harmonizing its law with international trade law and engaging 
with the international system of trade and commerce. 
One important recent development is Turkey’s accession to the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG),8 a step of potential 
significance in the continuing improvement of the legal framework in which international 
trade in goods takes place.  As such, Turkey has made an important decision to play a 
role in the continuing effort to promote the development of, and to remove barriers to, 
international trade.  This is not the first or the last step Turkey will take, but it is an 
important step for Turkey and for its trading partners, including the United States. 
Fifteen years ago, in reference to Turkey’s entry into the customs union with the 
European Union, Rouleau asserted that “[b]ringing Turkish laws into compliance with 
those of the EU [would] create a homogenous and stable environment that in turn should 
provide the necessary security for Turkey’s private sector to thrive.”9 Similarly today, 
bringing Turkey’s sales law into conformity with the emerging dominant body of 
international sales law in the international system of trade will increase predictability and 
promote uniformity in respect of international contracts entered into by Turkish buyers 
and sellers.  That increased predictability and uniformity will reduce uncertainty, 
decrease transaction costs, and allow international trade and commerce involving Turkish 
buyers and sellers to thrive. 
And of course there is potentially more than Turkey’s continuing legal and 
economic growth and development at stake.  Turkey has the ability to play an important 
role and to wield meaningful influence in its region.  As Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and 
                                               
4 See generally id. 
5 See, e.g., Sebnem Arsu, 7 More Journalists Detained in Turkey, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2011. 
6 See id. 
7 U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, UN rights office calls on Turkey to ensure press 
freedom after journalists’ arrest (Mar. 15, 2011), available at 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/printnews.asp?nid=37766 (last visited Mar. 17, 2011).   
8 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, opened for signature Apr. 
11, 1980, S. Treaty Doc. No. 98-9 (1983), 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, 19 I.L.M. 668 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1988) 
[hereinafter CISG]. 
9 Rouleau, supra note 1, at 81. 
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other parts of North Africa and the Middle East experience political and social 
upheaval,10 the international community should focus intently on how best to bring 
stability to the region, not only in the near-term future, but also with respect to the long 
term.  Part of the recipe for stability will certainly involve attention to the rule of law, 
democracy, and human rights.11  But robust trade and commerce can contribute to 
economic stability, and economic stability in turn has the potential to help reduce sources 
of unrest.  This can ultimately contribute to supporting the rule of law and bolstering the 
democratic process.  After all, “‘[d]emocracy is bad news for terrorists.’”12  Turkey can 
play an important role in contributing to that stability. 
I. TURKEY AND TRADE 
A. Turkey’s Role in International Trade 
Turkey’s role in international trade is already significant.  Its significance is due 
to the size of its economy and its volume of trade; its active involvement with 
international organizations; and its influence in the region.  With the seventeenth largest 
economy in the world,13 Turkey is an important and influential actor in world trade and 
commerce, and its significance seems only to be increasing.14 
1. Trade with the European Union 
A member of the European customs unions and a formal candidate for 
membership in the European Union, a large percentage of Turkey’s total trade is with EU 
member states.  In fact, total trade with EU member states in 2010 was €103,211,000,000 
(more than one hundred three billion euro),15 making Turkey one of the EU’s largest 
trading partners.  At the same time, however, despite Turkey’s customs union with the 
European Union, the European Commission has recently concluded that Turkey’s 
“[t]echnical barriers to trade are still hampering free movement of goods”16 and, perhaps 
of even greater concern, that “new barriers have been added in areas such as 
pharmaceuticals and construction products.”17  Still, the European Commission also 
recognized that the European Union’s customs union with Turkey “continues to 
                                               
10 See, e.g., Alan Cowell, Libyans do what West would not, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 5, 2011, at 2. 
11 See, e.g., Chris Arsenault, Brazil’s ‘lessons’ for Arab rebels, AL JAZEERA, Mar. 4, 2011, available at 
http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/features/2011/03/201134183658331534.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2011). 
12 Scott Shane, As Regimes Fall in Arab World, Al Qaeda Sees History Fly By, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2011 
(quoting Paul R. Pillar). 
13 See The World Factbook, Country Comparison: GDP (2010), CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 
available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2011). 
14 See Landon Thomas Jr., Turning East, Turkey Asserts Economic Power, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2010. 
15 See EU Bilateral Trade & Trade with the World, Turkey, at 3 (Mar. 17, 2011), available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113456.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2011). 
16 Turkey 2010 Progress Report, supra note 3, § 4.1. 
17 Id. 
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contribute to the enhancement of EU-Turkey bilateral trade ….”18  And the fact remains 
that Turkey is the European Union’s seventh biggest trading partner.19 
While trade with the European Union accounts for a significant amount – 
approximately 42.9% in 2009 – of Turkey’s trade, Turkey has significant trade balances 
with non-EU countries as well.  Turkey’s other largest trading partners are Algeria, 
China, Iran, Iraq, Russia, Switzerland, Ukraine, and the United States. 
2. Trade with the United States 
From a U.S. perspective, Turkey is an important friend and a significant trading 
partner.  In 2010, U.S. exporters exported to Turkey merchandise with an aggregate value 
of USD $10,546,388,883, more than ten and a half billion U.S. Dollars.20  And Turkish 
exporters benefited from robust trade as well, exporting to the United States merchandise 
with an aggregate value of USD $4,203,675,173.21  Total trade between the United States 
and Turkey is voluminous, and it has been trending up on an annual basis.22 
Indeed, evidence of Turkey’s importance to the United States is offered by a 
legislative bill that was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives in February 2011 
to express the sense of the House that the United States ought to initiate negotiations to 
enter into a bilateral free trade agreement with Turkey.23  Naturally, much of the 
resolution focuses on Turkey’s importance in international trade.24  It also recognizes 
some of the collateral benefits that can flow from robust trade and commerce between 
independent nations.25  For example, one assumption stated in the proposed resolution is 
that “closer relations with Turkey through free trade agreements would encourage further 
privatization in Turkey’s economy.”26 
As barriers to trade continue to fall, more and more Turkish entities and U.S. 
entities will seek good opportunities for profitable commercial relationships and other 
ways to engage in mutually beneficial business transactions. 
                                               
18 Id. § 1.3. 
19 See id. 
20 See 2010 Exports to Turkey of NAICS Total All Merchandise, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
ADMINISTRATION, http://tse.export.gov/TSE/TSEHome.aspx (Click on “National Trade Data”; then click 
“Product Profiles of U.S. Merchandise Trade with a Selected Market”; under “Trade Partner” select 
“Individual Countries” and “Turkey”; under “Product” select “Exports”; then click Go) (last visited Mar. 
25, 2011). 
21 See 2010 Imports from Turkey of NAICS Total All Merchandise, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
ADMINISTRATION, http://tse.export.gov/TSE/TSEHome.aspx (Click on “National Trade Data”; then click 
“Product Profiles of U.S. Merchandise Trade with a Selected Market”; under “Trade Partner” select 
“Individual Countries” and “Turkey”; under “Product” select “Imports”; then click Go) (last visited Mar. 
25, 2011). 
22 See id.  This has been true for several years with the sole exception of 2009, when global trade was 
generally down due to the global economic crisis.  See id. 
23 See H.R. RES. 103, 112th Cong. (2011). 
24 See id. 
25 See id. 
26 Id. 
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3. International Organizations 
Sometimes the importance of an economic relationship – and the significance of a 
state – is not measured solely by volume of trade or size of the economy.  Turkey is an 
active participant in the international community.  Turkey is a founding member of the 
Group of Twenty (G-20)27 and of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD).28  Turkey is also a member of the World Trade Organization and 
has been since 1995, its first year of operation.29  It is clear that Turkey has a high level 
of engagement with the major international organizations that influence the world 
economy.   
Turkey is also a very important bridge between the West and the Muslim world 
and to the Caucasian and Central Asian region in particular.  A recent poignant example 
of Turkey’s important role as intermediary between the West and the Muslim world is 
offered by the current conflict in Libya.  Among other things, Turkey has played a neutral 
role by urging Muammar Qaddafi to step down, on the one hand, while rebuking the 
West for certain aspects of its involvement in Libya, on the other hand.30  The Turkish 
embassy in Libya has served as an intermediary for the United States and other Western 
states,31 and it has helped obtain the release of four Western journalists, who were held 
by Libyan authorities but eventually released into the custody of Turkish diplomats.32  It 
is noteworthy that Qaddafi, early in the conflict in Libya, announced a press conference 
in connection with the Libyan uprising and the response of his regime, but then refused to 
take questions from members of the international media who had been gathered for 
nearly eight hours for the press conference, yet nevertheless gave a private interview to 
Turkish television.33 
Some of Turkey’s regional leadership arises in the private sector.  By way of 
example, in 1990 the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey was a 
founding member of the Economic Cooperation Organization Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (ECO-CCI), which today boasts ten members, all in the Caucasus and Southwest 
                                               
27 The G-20, which was established in 1999 as a response to the financial crises of the late 1990s, was 
created “to bring together systemically important industrialized and developing economies” for regular 
dialogue on key issues related to global economic stability.  What is the G-20, 
http://www.g20.org/about_what_is_g20.aspx (last visited Mar. 10, 2011). 
28 See History, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), 
http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36761863_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Mar. 25, 
2011); see also OECD, List of OECD Member countries - Ratification of the Convention on the OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1889402_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Mar. 
25, 2011). 
29 Turkey has been a member of the WTO since March 26, 1995.  See Turkey and the WTO, WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/turkey_e.htm (last visited Mar. 
10, 2011). 
30 See Selcan Hacaoglu, Libyan conflict tests Turkey’s regional role, ASSOC. PRESS, Mar. 25, 2011. 
31 See id. 
32 See Jeremy W. Peters, Freed Times Journalists Give Account of Captivity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2011. 
33 Uri Friedman, Qaddafi Spurns Western Media for Turkish TV, ATLANTIC WIRE, Mar. 9, 2011. 
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Asia.34  Specifically, in addition to Turkey, the chambers of commerce and industry (or 
the equivalent) in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are all part of the ECO-CCI.35  The purposes of the ECO-
CCI are to create common policies among its members and to offer guidance to its 
members; to increase contacts among its members; and to provide a forum for sharing 
information and experience.36  The organization aims to “[lead] the society in the 
region.”37  It offers an example of the leadership role Turkey can play in the region. 
Moreover, Turkey itself “offers a location that can serve as a springboard for later 
exports to the countries bordering on the Black Sea to the north, the Caucasian republics 
and Central Asia to the east, and the oil states of the Middle East to the south.”38 
In short, Turkey is in some respects uniquely important to the United States and to 
the international community. 
II. INTRODUCING THE CISG 
A. Turkey’s Accession to the CISG 
One contribution that Turkey makes is through its participation in international 
legal systems relating to trade and commerce.  The latest development in Turkey’s 
continuing movement toward harmonization of its laws with international trade law is 
Turkey’s accession to the CISG.  Turkey acceded to the CISG on July 7, 2010, and the 
CISG will therefore enter into force for Turkey on August 1, 2011.39  Turkey’s accession 
to the CISG brings to seventy-six the growing number of parties to the CISG, which has 
included the United States since 1988.40 
The Deputy Permanent Representative of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the 
United Nations, Fazlı Çorman, stated during a session of the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) that took place in New York on July 7, 2010, 
that “improvement of the legal framework in which international trade operates is a 
                                               
34 See Economic Cooperation Organization Chamber of Commerce and Industry, ABOUT ECO-CCI, 
ECO-CCI and Its Activities, http://www.ecocci.com/NDC/Generic/Content/About.aspx (last visited 
Feb. 19, 2011). 
35 Id. 
36 See id. 
37 Id. 
38 Rouleau, supra note 1, at 82. 
39 “When a State ratifies, accepts, approves or accedes to this Convention … this Convention … enters into 
force in respect of that State … on the first day of the month following the expiration of twelve months 
after the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.”  CISG, 
supra note 8, art. 99(2). 
40 See United Nations Treaty Collection, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General, 
Chapter X: International Trade and Development, United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (Apr. 11, 1980), Status, available at 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20X/X-10.en.pdf [hereinafter CISG 
Status]. 
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fundamental aspect of” the development of international trade “on the basis of equality 
and mutual benefit.”41   
B. Background on the CISG 
The CISG is an international treaty that provides uniform rules for international 
sale of goods contracts.42  The CISG was adopted to promote friendly relations among 
countries by contributing to the development of international trade on the basis of 
equality and mutual benefit.43   
1. The CISG and Europe 
The CISG is quite clearly relevant within the European Union.  Of the twenty-
seven EU member states44 and four formal candidates for EU membership,45 only four 
countries are not yet parties to the CISG:  Ireland, Malta, Portugal, and the United 
Kingdom.46  Thus, a large percentage of the European Union has adopted the CISG.  And 
it is not only the governments of these EU member states and candidate countries that are 
comfortable enough with the CISG to have become parties.  Instead, private parties with 
their places of business in EU member states, such as Germany, have shown at least some 
willingness to be governed by the CISG as well.47 
2. The CISG Outside of Europe 
In order to increase the likelihood that the CISG would actually contribute to the 
development of international trade (and not just trade among Western nations), 
UNCITRAL desired to obtain broader acceptance by countries of different legal, social 
and economic systems.  One goal of the CISG, after all, is the removal of legal barriers to 
international trade.48  Accomplishing that goal in any sort of meaningful way requires 
actual participation by countries of different legal, social, and economic systems.  
Therefore, UNCITRAL endeavored to involve such countries in the preparation of the 
CISG. 
                                               
41 Fazlı Çorman, Deputy Perm. Rep., Chargé d’affaires a.i., of the Perm. Mission of Turk. to the U.N., 
Statement at the 43rd Session of UNCITRAL (July 7, 2010), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/news/Turkey-CISG-statement.pdf [hereinafter Çorman]. 
42 See CISG, supra note 8, pmbl. 
43 See id. 
44 The twenty-seven member states of the European Union are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom.  See Europa, Gateway to the European Union, The member countries of the European 
Union, http://europa.eu./about-eu/member-countries/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2011). 
45 In addition to Turkey, the three other formal candidates for EU membership are Croatia, the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Iceland.  See id. 
46 See CISG Status, supra note 40. 
47 See Spagnolo, supra note 54, at 138 n.8. 
48 See id.; see also id., explanatory note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat on the UN Convention on Contracts 
for the Int’l Sale of Goods, ¶ 3 [hereinafter CISG Explanatory Note].  The CISG Explanatory Note was 
prepared by the UNCITRAL Secretariat for informational purposes and is not an official commentary to the 
CISG.  See id. 
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Indeed, the CISG is hardly a European or even a Western phenomenon.  In fact, 
one of the purposes of the CISG was to replace two predecessor international sales law 
treaties that were criticized for “reflecting primarily the legal traditions and economic 
realities of continental Western Europe,” the region that predominantly prepared the 
predecessor conventions.49  In preparing the CISG and achieving its adoption, 
UNCITRAL seems to have achieved greater success in wider acceptance, demonstrated 
by the fact that the original eleven parties to the CISG “included States from every 
geographical region, every stage of economic development and every major legal, social 
and economic system.”50  And the CISG was notably drafted in six official languages, 
Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish, each of which is equally 
authentic.51  As an example of the importance this has for Turkey, among Turkey’s top 
trading partners outside of the European Union, China, Russia, and Iraq are all already 
parties to the CISG.52 
C. A Work in Progress 
While its purposes are laudable, the CISG is a work in progress.  It was finalized 
and first signed in 1980 after years of preparatory work by UNCITRAL, but it did not 
enter into force until 1988.53  Moreover, in some jurisdictions, notably including the 
United States, the CISG has been slow to emerge as a viable alternative body of sales 
law.54  This seems to be due more to unfamiliarity with and unfounded suspicion of the 
CISG than to meaningful analysis of the substantive allocation of risk and responsibility 
established by the CISG.55   
This is not the case everywhere, however, as buyers and sellers in some 
jurisdictions have become quite accustomed to the CISG.56  And it is beginning to change 
in the United States as well, as the U.S. bench and bar become more familiar with the 
CISG, and as the body of U.S. case law interpreting or analyzing the CISG grows.57  And 
                                               
49 CISG Explanatory Note, supra note 48, ¶ 3. 
50 Id. ¶ 4.  The original eleven parties were Argentina, China, Egypt, France, Hungary, Italy, Lesotho, 
Syria, the United States, Yugoslavia, and Zambia.  See id. 
51 See CISG, supra note 8, signature block. 
52 See CISG Status, supra note 40. 
53 See id.  The CISG provides for its entry into force “on the first day of the month following the expiration 
of twelve months after the date of deposit of the tenth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession ….”  CISG, supra note 8, art 99(1). 
54 There is a strong tendency by U.S. lawyers to counsel their clients to exclude application of the CISG.  
See Lisa Spagnolo, A Glimpse through the Kaleidoscope: Choices of Law and the CISG, 13 VINDOBONA J. 
INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 135, 135 & n.2 (2009). 
55 See id. at 137-40. 
56 See id. at 137-38, n.8, n.9 & n.10. 
57 For years after the CISG entered into force, U.S. courts routinely took note of the relative paucity of 
decisions by U.S. courts interpreting or applying the CISG.  See, e.g., Miami Valley Paper, LLC v. Lebbing 
Eng’g & Consulting GmbH, No. 1:05-CV-00702, 2009 WL 818618, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2009) 
(acknowledging that the case law interpreting and applying the CISG is sparse); Forestal Guarani, S.A. v. 
Daros Int’l, Inc., Civil Action No. 03-4821 (JAG), 2008 WL 4560701, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 8, 2008), rev’d on 
other grounds, 613 F.3d 395, 396 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Although the CISG has been in force for nearly two 
decades, there still are few U.S. decisions interpreting the Convention.”).  This is beginning to change, 
however.  In 2009 there were thirteen opinions reported by U.S. courts that recognized the application or 
potential application of the CISG and/or that analyzed the CISG in some way, though most contained little 
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as more and more countries accede to the CISG and more and more transactions are 
automatically governed by the CISG, its relevance around the world increases. 
D. Moving toward Reducing Uncertainty 
So how is the CISG to accomplish the goal of improving the legal framework in 
which international trade operates?  Imagine the following hypothetical situation: 
A Turkish buyer negotiates with a U.S. supplier for the purchase of certain 
capital equipment, which the Turkish buyer will use in its production 
facility in Istanbul.  Following a successful conclusion to the negotiation, 
the parties enter into a written Capital Equipment Supply Agreement, 
which identifies the purchase price, method and timing of payments, 
timeline for performance, provisions for delay liquidated damages, design 
specifications, warranty terms (including an express disclaimer of implied 
warranties of merchantability and fitness for any particular purpose), 
procedures and standards for acceptance testing, and some other general 
commercial terms, but the written agreement does not include a choice-of-
law clause.   
 
The U.S. supplier has an Italian affiliate, and the U.S. supplier 
subcontracts with its Italian affiliate for the fabrication and delivery of the 
capital equipment.  After fabrication and delivery are complete, the U.S. 
supplier sends a technical team to erect and start up the capital equipment 
and to satisfy the agreed-upon acceptance test at the buyer’s site in 
Istanbul.  The equipment satisfies the acceptance test, and final payment is 
made. 
 
While operating the equipment in subsequent weeks, something goes 
wrong with the equipment, necessitating a shutdown of the equipment and 
the facility.  The Turkish buyer incurs significant costs related to the 
shutdown, including costs of inspection, repair costs, lost profits, lost 
customers, and labor costs associated with the shutdown.  The Turkish 
buyer believes that a latent defect in the equipment caused the shutdown 
and decides to bring a claim against the U.S. supplier. 
 
If the buyer in the hypothetical situation brings a claim (whether in Turkey, in the 
United States, or somewhere else), one of the threshold questions for the court will be, 
what law governs the contract and the contract dispute?  Is it Turkish law, the law of a 
U.S. state, Italian law, or some other body of law?  A court will use its principles 
pertaining to private international law (or conflicts of laws, as it is known in the United 
States) to determine which body of law applies.  How a court would answer the question 
(that is, the principles that it will use) will be very different from one jurisdiction to the 
                                                                                                                                            
analysis. See William P. Johnson, U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, in 
International Commercial Transactions, Franchising, and Distribution, 44 INT’L LAW. 238, 239-40 (2010).  
And in 2010 there were sixteen opinions reported by U.S. courts that contained some analysis or 
interpretation of the CISG, so the body of U.S. case law is growing. 
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next.  In fact, there are differences among various U.S. states, which can lead to 
application by different courts of different bodies of law under the same facts and the 
same set of circumstances. 
That threshold determination of applicable law can in turn affect how other 
important questions are answered:  What warranties (statutory, express, or implied) can 
be shown to have been made?  Will the warranty disclaimer effectively exclude implied 
warranties?  Are there statutory warranties that cannot be waived, which might have been 
breached?  How is the seller’s performance measured?  Does the Turkish buyer have to 
establish ‘fundamental breach’ in order to recover damages?  What kinds of damages can 
the buyer claim, if a breach is ultimately shown?  For example, are lost profits or other 
consequential damages recoverable?  Will the prevailing party be able to recover 
attorneys’ fees? 
How a court would answer these and similar questions will be very different 
under different bodies of law, and a considerable amount of time, energy, and resources 
could be spent trying to navigate all of the potentially applicable bodies of law.  This 
uncertainty increases the cost of doing business.  And this uncertainty contributed to the 
United States’ decision to ratify the CISG: 
International trade now is subject to serious legal uncertainties.  Questions 
often arise as to whether our law or foreign law governs the transaction, 
and our traders and their counsel find it difficult to evaluate and answer 
claims based on one or another of the many unfamiliar foreign legal 
systems.  The Convention’s uniform rules offer effective answers to these 
problems.58 
 
Now that Turkey is a party to the CISG, the uncertainty and the associated dispute 
resolution costs are readily reduced or eliminated, as the contract and the contract dispute 
described in the hypothetical situation would be governed not by domestic sales law, but 
by the CISG, no matter which court – U.S., Turkish, or Italian – hears the claim. 
As the CISG becomes increasingly relevant in the United States and as trade with 
Turkey continues to rise, Turkey’s accession to the CISG therefore creates an important 
common legal framework for sales transactions between Turkish and U.S. contracting 
parties, and it has immediate importance for international sale of goods transactions 
involving counterparties located in numerous jurisdictions that have particular 
significance for Turkey. 
Additionally, it is conceivable that Turkey will pave the way for further expansion 
of the CISG in the region.  Of the nine other countries whose chambers of commerce and 
industry are members of the ECO-CCI, discussed in Part x, supra, so far only two are 
parties to the CISG:  Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.59  Given the purposes of the ECO-CCI 
and the role Turkey plays in the region, it seems likely that Turkey’s accession to the 
                                               
58 Letter of Transmittal from President Reagan to the Senate of the U.S. (Sept. 21, 1983), in S. Treaty Doc. 
No. 98-9, at iii (1983) [hereinafter Letter of Transmittal]. 
59 See CISG Status, supra note 40. 
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CISG will help to pave the way for other Caucasian and Central Asian republics – among 
others – to follow suit.  In fact, Çorman has called on non-signatories to do just that:   
Having 74 state parties from every geographical region, every stage of 
economic development and every major legal, social and economic system 
clearly demonstrates the objectivism and comprehensive nature of the 
Convention. 
 
Today Turkey, by submitting the instrument of accession, joins the State 
Parties of the Convention. 
 
We would like to call other states that are not party yet to consider 
becoming parties to the Convention.60 
 
III. MAKING THE CISG MEANINGFUL 
Of course, accession to the CISG is the first step only.  There are three additional 
steps to be taken before the CISG can have the positive effect it is designed to have – 
steps that are, frankly, still in early stages in the United States as well.  First, practitioners 
in Turkey must familiarize themselves with the CISG in order to provide their clients 
with sound advice regarding whether the CISG or some other body of sales law is the 
best choice of law to govern any particular agreement.  Such advice should not take the 
form of automatic application or exclusion of the CISG.  Rather, to give meaningful 
advice requires deep understanding of the choices available to the parties, including the 
CISG, and careful consideration of the circumstances of the transaction that support 
selection of one body of law over another.  Because the CISG automatically applies to 
certain sale of goods contracts unless the CISG has been excluded by the parties to the 
contract, such advice must include advice regarding whether to exclude application of the 
CISG.61 
Second, Turkish courts and other decision-makers must develop the familiarity 
with the CISG that is necessary to interpret and apply the CISG in good faith, which they 
are required under international law to do.62  International law further requires that a 
treaty’s interpretation be governed by analysis of its text and its context, in light of its 
object and purpose.63  And the CISG itself specifically requires courts to interpret the 
CISG with due regard to the international character of the CISG, to the need to apply the 
CISG uniformly, and “to the need to promote … the observance of good faith in 
                                               
60 Çorman, supra note 41 (emphasis added). 
61 See CISG, supra note 8, arts. 1(1) and 6. 
62 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 115 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 
[hereinafter Vienna Convention].  While Turkey is not a party to the Vienna Convention, the Vienna 
Convention is widely recognized as codification of customary international law, that is, of the customary 
law of treaties.  To the extent the Vienna Convention is a codification of customary international law, it is 
binding as a matter of international law even on those states that are not parties to the Vienna Convention.  
See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 
993, 3 Bevans 1179. 
63 See id. 
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international trade.”64  While U.S. courts continue to find their way, sometimes 
interpreting the CISG soundly and sometimes not, Turkish courts have a clean slate and 
an opportunity to establish right away a reputation and tradition of faithful and careful 
interpretation and application of the CISG, which will greatly enhance predictability and 
certainty for Turkish parties to international sales contracts. 
And third, Turkish law schools must integrate into their curriculum meaningful 
coverage of the CISG so that the future members of the Turkish bench and bar have 
received the training and education that will facilitate steps one and two.65  After all, “the 
less exposure a lawyer has had to the CISG at law school, the more inclined the lawyer 
will be toward exclusion in practice.”66  Similarly, the more exposure – through 
meaningful training and education – a lawyer has had to the CISG while in law school, 
the more able the lawyer will be to understand the CISG and to provide her client with 
effective advice regarding its application, its interpretation, its advantages, and its 
disadvantages. 
A. Automatic Application of the CISG 
One key aspect of proper understanding of the CISG is to know when it applies 
and when it does not.  Under Article 1(1)(a) the CISG automatically applies to contracts 
for the sale of goods that are made between parties whose respective places of business 
are in different countries when the countries are “Contracting States” (that is, parties to 
the CISG).67  Under Article 1(1)(b) the CISG also applies to contracts for the sale of 
goods between parties whose places of business are in different countries even when one 
or more of the parties has its place of business in a country that is not a Contracting State, 
if the “rules of private international law [would] lead to the application of the law of a 
Contracting State.”68  The United States declared when it ratified the CISG that the 
United States would not be bound by Article 1(1)(b),69 a declaration for which the CISG 
specifically provides.70  Article 1(1)(b) is therefore inapplicable in the United States.  
However, Turkey made no such declaration, and Turkish courts should therefore apply 
the CISG not only when the parties to the contract for the sale of goods have their 
respective places of business in different countries that are parties to the CISG, but also 
when Turkey’s principles pertaining to private international law would lead to application 
of the substantive law of any party to the CISG, including Turkey. 
                                               
64 See CISG, supra note 8, art. 7(1) (“In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its 
international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good 
faith in international trade.”). 
65 See Spagnolo, supra note 54, at 141-42. 
66 Id. at 142. 
67 CISG, supra note 8, art. 1(1)(a).  The term “Contracting States” refers to countries that have signed the 
CISG and have also ratified, accepted, or approved the CISG, and it refers to non-signatory countries that 
have acceded to the CISG.  See CISG, supra note 8, art. 91.  Therefore, “Contracting States” is the term 
used in the CISG to refer to its parties. 
68 Id. art. 1(1)(b). 
69 See CISG Status, supra note 40, at 4. 
70 See CISG, supra note 8, art. 95. 
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B. Contracts outside the Scope of the CISG 
The CISG does not apply to all international sales, however.  In fact, there are 
numerous sales that are expressly excluded from the scope of application of the CISG.71  
Perhaps the most notable exclusion is that the CISG does not apply to sales “of goods 
bought for personal, family or household use,” unless the seller did not know and had no 
reason to know at the time the contract was made that the goods sold were intended for 
any such use.72  The CISG also does not apply to mixed sales of goods and services when 
“the preponderant part of the obligations” of the seller consists in the supply of labor or 
other services.73  Similarly, the CISG does not apply to toll manufacturing or similar 
arrangements when the buyer supplies the seller with “a substantial part of the materials 
necessary” for the manufacture or production of the goods.74 
In the typical cross-border sales transaction involving non-consumer goods, 
however, when each party knows the other party is located in a different country, the 
CISG will usually govern the transaction, if the parties’ places of business that are most 
directly involved with the transaction are in countries that are parties to the CISG.75  
Because there are currently seventy-six parties to the CISG,76  including most of Turkey’s 
major trading partners, the CISG is potentially relevant for a very large volume of 
international trade involving Turkish buyers and sellers. 
C. The Effect of Choosing Turkish Law 
One source of confusion regarding exclusion of the CISG is the role that a choice-
of-law clause should play in a court’s analysis concerning the parties’ intent to exclude 
application of the CISG.  In the United States, some courts have incorrectly reasoned or 
concluded that a choice-of-law clause that chooses the jurisdiction whose laws are to 
govern the contract but that is silent on the application of the CISG effectively excludes 
the CISG.77  However, when the parties include a choice-of-law clause in their 
agreement, if the jurisdiction whose law is selected by the choice-of-law clause is a state 
within the United States or is a country that is a party to the CISG, including Turkey, then 
such a choice-of-law clause generally should not have the effect of excluding the CISG 
                                               
71 See id. arts. 2 and 3. 
72 Id. art. 2(a).  Other international sales are specifically excluded from the CISG’s scope because if the 
nature of the sale (that is, sales by auction and sales on execution or otherwise by authority of law).  See id. 
arts. 2(b) and 2(c).  And still others are excluded due to the nature of the goods being sold (namely, stocks, 
shares, investment securities, negotiable instruments, and money; ships, vessels, hovercraft, and aircraft; 
and electricity).  See id. arts. 2(d)-2(f). 
73 Id. art. 3(2). 
74 Id. art. 3(1). 
75 See id. art. 1(1)(a). 
76 See CISG Status, supra note 40. 
77 See, e.g., Am. Biophysics Corp. v. Dubois Marine Specialties, 411 F. Supp. 2d 61, 63 (D.R.I. 2006) 
(concluding that a choice-of-law clause choosing the laws of the state of Rhode Island – but silent on the 
CISG – was sufficient to exclude application of the CISG).  For criticism of the American Biophysics 
decision, see Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Saint-Gobain Technical Fabrics Can. Ltd., 474 F. Supp. 2d 
1075, 1081-82 (D. Minn. 2007); see also William P. Johnson, Understanding Exclusion of the CISG: A 
New Paradigm of Determining Party Intent, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 213, 230-32 (2011). 
WPJ DRAFT – 8/18/2011 
© 2011 William P. Johnson 14
when the CISG is otherwise applicable.  This is so because the CISG is the law of the 
selected jurisdiction.78   
The travaux préparatoires of the CISG support the notion that the CISG becomes 
part of the national laws of a country upon that country’s ratification of (or accession to) 
the CISG.79  For example, according to Mr. Plantard of France, “when a State had the 
Convention ratified by its Parliament, it decided by the same action to incorporate the 
rules into its legal system.”80  Similarly, Mr. Shafik of Egypt said that “the provisions of 
the Convention were incorporated in the national law of a contracting State.”81   
Fortunately, a large number of U.S. courts have recognized that a choice-of-law 
clause selecting the law of a country that is a party to the CISG, or selecting the law of a 
U.S. state, has the effect of selecting the CISG as well.82  One federal appellate court, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, concluded in BP Oil International, Ltd. v. 
Empresa Estatal Petroleos de Ecuador that a choice-of-law clause selecting the laws of 
Ecuador merely confirmed that the CISG governed the transaction because the CISG is 
part of the law of Ecuador.83  A significant number of other U.S. courts have taken that 
position.  Recently, in Remy, Inc. v. Tecnomatic S.p.A., a federal court in Indiana 
considered a choice-of-law clause selecting the laws of the State of Indiana in a 
                                               
78 For jurisdictions within the United States, this is so as a matter of U.S. constitutional law.  See U.S. 
CONST. art. VI.  For a more detailed analysis of the effect of a choice-of-law clause on application of the 
CISG under U.S. constitutional law, see Johnson, supra note 77, at 223-28. 
79 The travaux préparatoires, or drafting history, of a treaty is relevant for a court’s interpretation of the 
treaty.  See Vienna Convention, supra note 62, art. 32. 
80 Summary Records of the First Committee, 4th Meeting, ¶ 40, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/C.1/SR.4 (Mar. 13, 
1980), reprinted in United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Official 
Records, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/19, at 251 (1991). 
81 Id. ¶ 35. 
82 See, e.g., Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Saint-Gobain Technical Fabrics Can. Ltd., 474 F. Supp. 2d 
1075, 1081-82 (D. Minn. 2007) (concluding that mere reference to a specific state’s law does not constitute 
an exclusion of the CISG); Am. Mint LLC v. GOSoftware, Inc., No. Civ.A. 1:05-CV-650, 2006 WL 42090, 
at *3 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2006) (concluding that a choice-of-law clause choosing the laws of the State of 
Georgia but silent as to the application of the CISG would not have the effect of excluding the CISG); 
Valero Mktg. & Supply Co. v. Greeni Oy, 373 F. Supp. 2d 475, 482 (D.N.J. 2005) (concluding that 
inclusion in an oral agreement of a provision that New York law applied to the agreement did not exclude 
application of the CISG and that, under New York law, courts would apply the CISG by virtue of the 
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution), rev’d on other grounds, 242 F. App’x 840, 845 (3d Cir. 2007); 
Ajax Tool Works, Inc. v. Can-Eng Mfg. Ltd., No. 01 C 5938, 2003 WL 223187, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 
2003) (concluding that a choice-of-law clause choosing the laws of Ontario, Canada does not exclude the 
CISG); St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v. Neuromed Med. Sys. & Support, GmbH, No. 00 CIV. 9344(SHS), 
2002 WL 465312, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002) (recognizing that the CISG is an integral part of German 
law, and that when parties designate a choice-of-law clause in their contract selecting the law of a country 
that is a party to the CISG without excluding the CISG, the CISG is the law of the designated country); 
Asante Technologies, Inc. v. PMC-Sierra, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (concluding 
that a choice-of law clause choosing the law of British Columbia, Canada, chooses the CISG when it is 
applicable because the CISG is the law of British Columbia, and further concluding that a choice-of-law 
clause choosing the laws of California also would not exclude the CISG). 
83 BP Oil Int’l, Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos de Ecuador, 332 F.3d 333, 337 (5th Cir. 2003), as 
amended on denial of reh’g. 
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transaction between an Italian seller and a U.S. buyer.84  The court in Remy, Inc. reasoned 
that a choice-of-law provision “that specifies only that a signatory state’s law applies is 
insufficient [to opt out of the CISG] because the CISG is the law of that state.”85  Another 
U.S. federal court recently reasoned that “‘[a] signatory’s assent to the CISG necessarily 
incorporates the treaty as part of that nation’s domestic law.’”86 
For Turkish courts considering application of the CISG, the CISG should apply 
unless the parties have excluded it, and a simple choice-of-law clause choosing the laws 
of Turkey or the laws of any jurisdiction within the United States – or even a neutral 
country that is a party to the CISG, such as Germany, for that matter – to govern the 
agreement should not by itself have the effect of excluding application of the CISG.  On 
the contrary, such a choice-of-law clause would constitute strong evidence of the parties’ 
intent for their contract to be governed by the CISG. 
Except with respect to issues of contract formation, this is the case for any and all 
contracts entered into on or after August 1, 2011.87  This is not automatically the case, 
however, for any contracts entered into prior to that date.  For any such contracts, Turkish 
courts should apply their traditional private international law principles to determine the 
applicable body of law.  However, if application of principles pertaining to private 
international law leads to the application of the substantive law of a Contracting State 
with respect to which the CISG had entered into force at or prior to the time the parties 
entered into their contract, then pursuant to Article 1(1)(b) the CISG would still govern 
the contract unless the CISG has been excluded.88 
D. Effectively Excluding the CISG 
It is not enough for Turkish or U.S. courts to understand the CISG’s sphere of 
application and, therefore, when the CISG would apply by its terms to a contract, 
however.  Rather, courts must also consider whether the parties intended to exclude the 
                                               
84 See Remy, Inc. v. Tecnomatic S.p.A., No. 1:08-cv-1227-SEB-WGH, 2010 WL 4174594, at *1 (S.D. Ind. 
Oct. 18, 2010). 
85 Id. (emphasis in original). 
86 Semi-Materials Co., Ltd. v. MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc., No. 4:06CV1426 FRB, 2011 WL 134062, at *1 
(E.D. Mo. Jan. 10, 2011).  The court consequently granted a motion to exclude testimony of an expert that 
was sought under a federal rule of civil procedure permitting expert testimony to determine foreign law.  
See id. 
87 See CISG, supra note 8, art. 100(2).  The issue of applicability of the CISG is slightly more complicated 
when the court is dealing with an issue of formation, as opposed an issue of contract interpretation or 
enforcement, because Article 100 of the CISG makes a distinction between formation issues, on the one 
hand, and other issues.  Under Article 100(1) provides that the CISG “applies to the formation of a contract 
only when the proposal for concluding the contract is made on or after the date when the [CISG] enters into 
force in respect of the Contracting States referred to in [Article 1(1)(a)] or the Contracting State referred to 
in [Article 1(1)(b)].”  CISG, supra note 8, art. 100(1).  With respect to issues of formation, therefore, the 
CISG applies only if the date of the proposal for concluding the contract follows the relevant date of entry 
into force.  See id.  And the date of the “proposal” for concluding the contract refers to the offer in the 
contract formation process.  See id. art. 14(1); see also Ronald A. Brand & Harry M. Flechtner, Arbitration 
and Contract Formation in International Trade: First Interpretations of the U.N. Sales Convention, 12 J.L. 
& Com. 239, 249-50 (1993).  
88 See id.  
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CISG, because the CISG expressly provides for election not to be bound by the CISG:  
“The parties may exclude the application of this Convention ….”89   
Naturally, the right to exclude application of the CISG begs the question of how 
the parties are to exclude it.  It might be tempting to assume that the only way to exclude 
application of the CISG is by doing so expressly and, at least when there is a written 
contract, in writing.  Indeed, Turkish practitioners and their clients should be aware that 
many U.S. courts have suggested that that is the case.90  By way of example, earlier this 
year a federal court in New York reasoned that “intent to opt out of the CISG must be set 
forth in the contract clearly and unequivocally” in order to exclude the CISG when it 
otherwise applies.91 
In fact, including an express choice-of-law clause accompanied by an explicit 
exclusion of the CISG that is clear, conspicuous, and in a writing signed by the parties is 
arguably the most desirable means of excluding the CISG.  And if the parties wish their 
contract to be governed by the CISG, then it is sensible to include in their written contract 
an express choice-of-law clause opting for application of the CISG.  Additionally, even 
when the CISG is selected by the parties, the choice-of-law clause choosing the CISG 
should also clearly choose a domestic body of law as a supplemental body of law, 
because the CISG itself will not answer every question or resolve every dilemma that the 
parties might encounter. 92  In fact, if a question must be answered in order to resolve a 
dispute and the CISG does not provide the answer, courts are obligated under Article 7(2) 
to settle such questions “in conformity with the general principles on which [the CISG] is 
based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity with the law applicable by 
virtue of the rules of private international law.”93  Therefore, selecting the body of the 
law that the court is to use in order to settle such questions is also desirable, establishing 
at the beginning of the relationship the body of law that will govern the contract and its 
interpretation in the event that a dispute arises after the parties are no longer interested in 
cooperating with each other.  But it is important to note that the CISG does not require 
                                               
89 Id. art. 6. 
90 See, e.g., Forestal Guarani, S.A. v. Daros Int’l, Inc., Civ. Action No. 03-4821 (JAG), 2008 WL 4560701, 
at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 8, 2008) (“The inclusion of an alternate choice of law provision must . . . be announced 
explicitly in the contract.”); Sky Cast, Inc. v. Global Direct Distribution, LLC, Civil Action No. 07-161-
JBT, 2008 WL 754734, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 18, 2008) (“Although the parties to a contract normally 
controlled by the CISG may exclude the applicability of the CISG to their contract, any such exclusion 
must be explicit.”); Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Saint-Gobain Technical Fabrics Can. Ltd., 474 F. 
Supp. 2d 1075, 1082 (D. Minn. 2007) (concluding that a choice-of-law clause does not exclude the CISG 
“absent an express statement that the CISG does not apply”); St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v. Neuromed Med. 
Sys. & Support, GmbH, No. 00 CIV. 9344(SHS), 2002 WL 465312, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002) 
(reasoning that German law, and therefore the CISG, was the applicable body of law: “(1) both the U.S. 
and Germany are Contracting States to [the CISG], and (2) neither party chose, by express provision in the 
contract, to opt out of the application of the CISG”). 
91 Hanwha Corp. v. Cedar Petrochems., Inc., No. 09 Civ. 10559(AKH), 2011 WL 165404, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 18, 2011). 
92 Like any single body of law, the CISG is limited in its scope, not addressing every contingency or issue 
that could appear.  Indeed, certain items are specifically excluded from its scope, including the effect that 
the sale of goods contract might have on the property interest in the goods sold, see CISG, supra note 8, art. 
4(b), and liability for death or personal injury.  See id. art 5. 
93 Id. art 7(2). 
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written exclusion of the CISG, nor does it require exclusion to be express.  In fact, Article 
6 establishes no particular means of exclusion of the CISG.94  And Article 11 of the CISG 
specifically rejects any writing requirement, allowing a contract to be proved “by any 
means, including witnesses.”95 
Still, many courts are likely to conclude that exclusion of the CISG must be 
explicit in order to be effective.  While uncertainty can never be absolutely eliminated, it 
is good practice to include in the written contract an express clause that makes the 
parties’ mutual intent clear regarding the CISG, whether their intent is to exclude the 
CISG or for the CISG to apply, and regarding the domestic law that will govern the 
agreement, whether in lieu of or as a supplement to the CISG.96 
IV. CHOOSING THE CISG 
The analysis regarding choice of law in which a Turkish practitioner should 
engage is complex.  Among other things, the Turkish practitioner must consider whether 
the relevant contract clauses relating to choice of law are likely to be enforceable in 
jurisdictions where claims are likely to be filed.  In sales transactions with U.S. 
contracting parties, the Turkish practitioner must in particular consider whether the 
clauses would be enforced by a U.S. court, because the Turkish contracting party might 
need to seek the assistance of a U.S court to enforce a contractual agreement – or to 
recognize and enforce a foreign judgment or arbitral award – if the U.S. contracting 
party’s assets are located only within the territory of the United States. 
A. Anticipating the Dispute when Times are Good 
For some business relationships it might be difficult to persuade the client of the 
value of taking the time and incurring the expense that may be necessary to reach 
agreement on certain dispute resolution terms.  After all, when Turkish, U.S., and other 
companies enter into business relationships, the contracting parties often are optimistic 
about the future of that relationship.  Generally, each party expects the business 
relationship to be beneficial, or the parties would not freely enter into the contract.  In the 
ordinary case, the relationship proceeds without significant dispute, and applicable law 
never really matters to the parties. 
But sometimes contingencies – both foreseeable and unforeseeable – materialize 
that cause at least one of the parties to no longer wish to perform; to regret the bargain 
struck; or to suffer significant losses.  And sometimes, whether due to cultural 
differences, language barriers, or haste in the consummation of the transaction, 
misunderstandings regarding the agreed-upon allocation of risk and responsibility can 
occur.  Such contingencies and misunderstandings can cause the relationship to 
deteriorate in such a way that the parties no longer expect good things to happen.  When 
                                               
94 See id. art. 6. 
95 “A contract of sale need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing and is not subject to any other 
requirement as to form. It may be proved by any means, including witnesses.” CISG, supra note 8, art. 11. 
96 For additional analysis by the author of effective exclusion of the CISG, see generally Johnson, supra 
note 77. 
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those kinds of situations arise, disputes often follow, and applicable law can matter a 
great deal. 
Of course, contractual disputes, whether domestic or international, are never 
desirable.  Disputes cause delay, disputes can ruin fruitful business relationships, and 
resolution of disputes is time-consuming and expensive.  But international disputes can 
be especially difficult and costly.  In addition to all of the hardship associated with an 
ordinary domestic dispute, now the parties to the dispute must contend with international 
discovery, cross-border service of process, foreign legal proceedings, potentially 
applicable bodies of foreign law and international law, language barriers, cultural 
differences, and the logistical difficulties of dealing with a dispute that may be taking 
place in some far corner of the planet. 
For these reasons and others, the simple truth is that no amount of planning for 
dispute resolution can ever assure that a dispute that arises in an international business 
transaction will be easy or inexpensive to navigate, manage, or resolve.  But there are 
some important items that should be considered and addressed by the parties to any 
international transaction, and those items should be addressed before the parties enter into 
any contract, understanding, or arrangement, oral or written, and before they begin to 
conduct business with each other, or it could be too late to reach agreement once the 
parties are no longer interested in cooperating with each other. 
As the preceding section of this article suggests, one of the items that can and 
should be addressed in this regard in every international contract is choice of law.97 
B. Choice of Law 
In many jurisdictions the parties have at least some freedom to choose for 
themselves the body of law that will govern their contract.  Under Turkish law, 
international contracting parties are generally free to choose the law that will govern their 
contract.98  This is so in the United States as well.99  Thus, when a Turkish buyer or seller 
enters into a sale of goods transaction with a U.S. counterparty, the parties might 
conceivably choose Turkish law, the law of a U.S. state, or the law of a neutral 
jurisdiction (and, of course, they should also expressly choose to exclude or to be 
governed by the CISG).  However, there are some limits under U.S. law relating to which 
body of law U.S. contracting parties are able to choose to govern their contract.   
                                               
97 For a description and analysis by the author of some of the dispute resolution issues that should be 
considered by non-U.S. parties who enter into international business contracts with U.S. parties or that are 
governed by U.S. law, see William P. Johnson, Controvérsia no horizonte: Contratação para Resolução 
Eficaz de Disputas em Transações Comerciais Internacionais. Uma perspectiva norte-americana. [The 
Dispute on the Horizon: Contracting for Effective Dispute Resolution in International Business 
Transactions. A U.S. Perspective.], 86 REVISTA DE DIREITO DO TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA DO ESTADO DO RIO 
DE JANEIRO 40 (Alexandre Freitas Câmara  & Antonio Carlos Esteves Torres trans., 2011) (Braz.). 
98 See Prof. Dr. Gülin Güngör, The Principle of Proximity in Contractual Obligations: The New Turkish 
Law on Private International Law and International Civil Procedure, 5 ANKARA L. REV. 1, 6 (2008) (citing 
Articles 24/1 and 24/2 of Milletlerarası Özel Hukuk ve Usul Hukuku Hakkında Kanun [Law on Private 
International Law and International Civil Procedure] (MÖHUK)). 
99 See U.C.C. § 1-301(a) (2011). 
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C. Limits in the United States on Choice of Law 
Notwithstanding the freedom of contract generally enjoyed within the United 
States, discussed in Part x, infra, U.S. parties are not free simply to select the law of 
whatever jurisdiction they wish to select to govern the contract, at least not in purely 
domestic transactions.  This is due to the fact that in the United States there are limits, 
established on a state-by-state basis, on the parties’ freedom to choose the jurisdiction 
whose laws will govern their transaction.  In general there must be some relationship 
between the transaction and the jurisdiction selected, or some courts in the United States 
are unlikely to enforce the parties’ choice of law.100 
1. Uniform Commercial Code – U.S. Domestic Sales Law 
In the United States there is a uniform law known as the Uniform Commercial 
Code (UCC),101 discussed in greater detail in Part x, infra.  Under the UCC, the parties 
are free to choose the state or country whose laws will govern their transaction, as long as 
the transaction bears a reasonable relation to the state or country selected: “Except as 
otherwise provided in this section, when a transaction bears a reasonable relation to this 
state and also to another state or nation the parties may agree that the law either of this 
state or of such other state or nation shall govern their rights and duties.”102  The official 
comments to Section 1-301 of the UCC confirm that the parties to a multi-state 
transaction or a transaction involving foreign trade have the right to choose their own 
law, but that the right to choose their own law “is limited to jurisdictions to which the 
transaction bears a ‘reasonable relation.’”103  The official comments continue:  
                                               
100 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 671.105(1) (2009). 
Except as provided in this section, when a transaction bears a reasonable relation to this state and 
also to another state or nation, the parties may agree that the law either of this state or of such 
other state or nation will govern their rights and duties.  Failing such agreement, this code applies 
to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this state. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
101 The UCC has been widely adopted into the law of the states of the United States.  Article 2 of the UCC 
generally applies to all transactions in goods.  See U.C.C. § 2-102 (2011).  Because Article 2 of the UCC 
defines “goods” quite broadly and without significant carve-outs, the scope of UCC Article 2 is very broad: 
“Goods” means all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time 
of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid, 
investment securities (Article 8) and things in action.  “Goods” also includes the unborn young of 
animals and growing crops and other identified things attached to realty as described in the section 
on goods to be severed from realty (Section 2-107). 
Id. § 2-105(1).  Article 2 of the UCC has been adopted by every state throughout the United States, other 
than by the State of Louisiana, making Article 2 of the UCC the primary domestic sales law in the United 
States.  See Uniform Commercial Code Locator, CORNELL UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL—LEGAL 
INFORMATION INSTITUTE, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/ucc.html#a2 (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).  See 
also Acts, UCC Articles 2 and 2A (2003), UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, http://www.nccusl.org/Act.aspx?title=UCC Articles 2 and 2A 
(2003) (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). 
102 U.C.C. § 1-301(a) (2011). 
103 Id. § 1-301 official cmt. 1. 
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“Ordinarily the law chosen must be that of a jurisdiction where a significant enough 
portion of the making or performance of the contract is to occur or occurs.”104 
2. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws – U.S. Common Law 
When the UCC is not applicable, there are several different approaches under the 
common law in the United States that are taken by different states for determining 
whether the parties’ choice of law is enforceable, but more states (though not a majority) 
follow some version of the approach set forth in the Second Restatement of Conflict of 
Laws than any other approach.105  Under that approach, courts may refuse to enforce a 
choice-of-law clause under two circumstances:  first, when there is no reasonable basis 
for the parties’ choice, and second when application of the chosen law would violate a 
fundamental public policy of another jurisdiction with a materially greater interest in the 
dispute.106  And when the parties and the transaction have no relationship with the 
jurisdiction selected, many U.S. courts will conclude that there is no reasonable basis for 
the parties’ selection, making the selection unenforceable.   
But when there is any reasonable basis for the selection, U.S. courts will generally 
respect the parties’ choice.  A choice-of-law clause choosing the laws of Turkey would 
almost certainly be enforced, especially when the buyer or seller has its place of business 
in Turkey or performance is to occur there.  Similarly, applying traditional choice-of-law 
rules, U.S. courts would enforce with little or no hesitation the parties’ selection of the 
law of any U.S. state where the U.S. counterparty has a place of business or where 
performance occurs or is to occur. 
                                               
104 Id. 
105 Restatements of the Law, including the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws, are produced by the 
American Law Institute, an independent organization in the United States made up of lawyers, judges, and 
law professors.  See The American Law Institute, About ALI, ALI Overview, 
http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.overview.  The Restatements are produced in an effort to 
explain what the common law is, but the Restatements are not themselves binding law.  They nevertheless 
can have considerable influence on the decisions of U.S. courts. 
106 The Second Restatement provides in relevant part as follows: 
(1)  The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and duties will be 
applied if the particular issue is one which the parties could have resolved by an explicit provision 
in their agreement directed to that issue. 
(2)  The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and duties will be 
applied, even if the particular issue is one which the parties could not have resolved by an explicit 
provision in their agreement directed to that issue, unless either 
(a)  the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and 
there is no other reasonable basis for the parties’ choice, or 
(b)  application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy 
of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination 
of the particular issue and which, under the rule of § 188, would be the state of the 
applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties. 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 (1971). 
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3. International Transactions 
Moreover, in international contexts, U.S. courts have shown willingness to respect 
the parties’ choices regarding forum and law, even when there is no apparent nexus with 
the selected jurisdiction, suggesting that U.S. courts will allow greater freedom to choose 
the laws of a neutral jurisdiction when the transaction is international.107  In the seminal 
case on forum selection, M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that the trial court gave too little weight and effect to a forum selection clause that 
appeared to designate the High Court of Justice in London as the exclusive forum for 
dispute resolution.108  And the Court concluded that the forum clause should control 
absent a strong showing setting it aside, a conclusion reached even though there was no 
apparent nexus with the jurisdiction selected.109  The court reasoned that “expansion of 
American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn 
contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our 
laws and in our courts.”110 
While M/S Bremen is a case primarily concerned with recognition and 
enforcement of a forum selection clause, the Court conducted its analysis under the 
apparent presumption that the English court would apply English law: 
[W]hile the contract here did not specifically provide that the substantive 
law of England should be applied, it is the general rule in English courts 
that the parties are assumed, absent contrary indication, to have designated 
the forum with the view that it should apply its own law.  It is therefore 
reasonable to conclude that the forum clause was also an effort to obtain 
certainty as to the applicable substantive law.111 
 
The Court’s reasoning therefore ought to apply with equal force to enforcement of 
choice of law.  And though the case was concerned with federal admiralty law (and not 
state contract law), state courts have nevertheless adopted the reasoning of M/S 
                                               
107 See, e.g., M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15, 92 S. Ct. 1907, 1916 (1972); see also 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629, 105 S. Ct. 3346, 3355 (1985) 
(recognizing broad discretion to select the method and forum of dispute resolution in the international 
context); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516, 94 S. Ct. 2449, 2455-56 (1974), rehearing 
denied (enforcing a forum selection clause that had been agreed upon by an Austrian company and a Us. 
Company, which provided for arbitration in Paris, France, and reasoning that, in the absence of a forum 
selection clause, considerable uncertainty “will almost inevitably exist with respect to any contract 
touching two or more countries, each with its own substantive laws and conflict-of-laws rules”); Filanto, 
S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int’l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (enforcing an agreement to 
arbitrate in Russia that was entered into between Italian and U.S. counterparties). 
108 407 U.S. at 8, 92 S. Ct. at 1912. 
109 See id. at 15, 92 S. Ct. at 1916. 
110 Id. at 9, 92 S. Ct. at 1912. 
111 Id. at 13 n.15, 92 S. Ct. at 1915 n.15 (citations omitted); see also id. at 9, 92 S. Ct. at 1913 (“We cannot 
have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on our terms, governed by 
our laws, and resolved in our courts.”); see also id. at 8 n.8, 92 S. Ct. at 1912 n.8 (noting that “the 
limitation fund in England would be only slightly in excess of $80,000 under English law”) (emphasis 
added). 
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Bremen.112  An express choice-of-law clause selecting the laws of a neutral third country 
is therefore likely to be enforced by U.S. courts in the context of an international 
commercial transaction, even in the absence of any relationship with the selected 
jurisdiction. 
D. Choosing U.S. Law 
When the parties agree to select U.S. law, however, the parties must select the 
particular U.S. state whose laws will govern the contract, for contract law is largely state 
– not federal – law in the United States.  The U.S. counterparty might initially negotiate 
for application of the law of its home state, due to familiarity and comfort with the law of 
the home state.  But it is very common for parties to international business transactions 
that are to be governed by U.S. law to choose New York as the state whose law will 
govern the transaction.  And this is so whether or not the transaction has any relationship 
with the State of New York.  While the reasons for choosing New York law to govern a 
transaction may be varied and complex, there are three reasons either that contribute to 
the practice of choosing New York law to govern international business transactions or 
that make the choice a sensible choice (or both). 
1. Why New York? 
First, when U.S. lenders are involved in financing a transaction or a project, the 
lenders will often insist on New York law as the law that is to govern the contract 
documents.113  And this applies not only to those contract documents that relate directly 
to the contractual relationship between the lender and the borrower, but also to contract 
documents entered into by the borrower with third parties who will perform for the 
borrower.  U.S. lenders do this for a variety of reasons, including consistency and 
predictability.  But one significant reason is to be confident that the security interest that 
the lenders take as protection against the risk of payment default will be recognized and 
enforceable – against all interested parties – under applicable law.  By consistently 
selecting New York law and following the rituals prescribed by New York law, the U.S. 
lenders reduce the risk of a security interest not being recognized or enforced. 
Second, even when U.S. lenders are not involved in the transaction, New York 
law is still often selected.  It seems that New York is a jurisdiction with which non-U.S. 
parties to international transactions tend to be more comfortable.  This could be due to 
general familiarity with New York (and a lack of familiarity with other U.S. states) or to 
prior experience with New York law.  Or it could be due to a perception that New York is 
a sophisticated jurisdiction with a highly developed body of commercial law and finance 
                                               
112 See, e.g., Prof’l Ins. Co. v. Sutherland, 700 So. 2d 347, 350 (Ala. 1997); Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. 
v. Superior Court, 551 P.2d 1206, 1208-09 (Cal. 1976); Jacobson v. Mailboxes Etc. U.S.A., Inc., 646 
N.E.2d 741, 743-44 (Mass. 1995); Micro Balanced Prods. Corp. v. Hlavin Indus. Ltd., 238 A.D.2d 284, 285 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1997). 
113 See generally Kimmo Mettälä, Governing-Law Clauses of Loan Agreements in International Project 
Financing, 20 INT’L LAW. 219 (1986). 
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law.114  Whatever the reasons, non-U.S. parties seem to be more comfortable agreeing to 
New York law than to the laws of other, less familiar U.S. states, so if the non-U.S. party 
is persuaded to agree to U.S. law, that often means, specifically, New York law. 
Third, there is a statutory basis for the selection of New York law.  There is a 
New York statute that provides that “[t]he parties to any contract, agreement or 
undertaking … may agree that the law of [New York] shall govern their rights and duties 
in whole or in part, whether or not such contract, agreement or undertaking bears a 
reasonable relation to [the state of New York],” as long as the contract, agreement or 
undertaking involves a transaction of at least $250,000 US Dollars.115  From New York’s 
perspective, there is no need for any relationship between such a transaction and the State 
of New York for the parties to choose New York law. 
2. Differences among U.S. States 
For some aspects of a business transaction, the state whose law is selected might 
matter a great deal, because some laws vary quite dramatically among U.S. states.  For 
example, some states within the United States offer varying degrees of protection to 
certain kinds of sales intermediaries,116 and it is conceivable that a protective statute 
could apply because of a choice-of-law clause when the protective statute would not have 
otherwise applied by its terms.  Also, enforcement of restrictive covenants is approached 
very differently by different states within the United States.  A covenant not to compete 
might not be enforceable at all under one state’s laws and might be fully enforced under 
another.  The State of California, for example, is generally much less permissive of 
covenants not to compete than other states.117 
3. Uniformity among States:  Article 2 of the UCC 
When it comes to transactions involving sales of goods, whether the parties 
choose to be governed by the law of the U.S. party’s home state, New York law, or the 
law of some other U.S. jurisdiction (with the sole exception of Louisiana), it is unlikely to 
make much difference for the body of substantive law governing the sales transaction. It 
will not matter all that much because in each case, the transaction will be governed by 
Article 2 of the UCC (together with Article 1 of the UCC),118 as adopted by the 
                                               
114 When New York enacted New York General Obligations Law Section 5-1401, it specifically “sought to 
secure and augment its reputation as a center of international commerce.”  Lehman Brothers Commercial 
Corp. v. Minmetals International Non-Ferrous Metals Trading Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 118, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000) (citing Edith Friedler, Party Autonomy Revisited: A Statutory Solution To a Choice-of-Law Problem, 
37 KAN. L. REV. 471, 497-98 (1989)). 
115 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401(1). 
116 See, e.g., Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law, WIS. STAT. § 135.01 et seq. 
117 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (“Except as provided in this chapter, every contract by which 
anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent 
void.”). 
118 See U.C.C. § 1-102 (2011) (“This article applies to a transaction to the extent that it is governed by 
another article of [the Uniform Commercial Code].”) (bracketed text in original). 
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applicable state, and as supplemented by that state’s common law.119  Thus, if a 
transaction is a sale of goods transaction that is to be governed by domestic U.S. law, it 
probably will not matter all that much for the commercial aspects of the transaction 
whether it is governed by the laws of Florida, New York, New Jersey, Wisconsin, or any 
other U.S. state (other than Louisiana).120  If the parties to a transaction between Turkish 
and U.S. buyers and sellers agree to opt for U.S. law (and to exclude the CISG), then for 
a sale of goods, that means that Article 2 of the UCC, as codified in the relevant state and 
as supplemented by that state’s common law, will govern. 
V. COMPARING THE CISG AND ARTICLE 2 OF THE UCC 
Of course, contracting parties should take advantage of freedom of contract to 
decide for themselves how to allocate risk and responsibility, as discussed in Part x, infra.  
But no matter how much time and energy the parties put into their carefully drafted 
written agreement, there will always be a possibility that some unimagined contingency, 
not addressed in the contract, materializes.  And there may be some terms that the parties 
simply do not take time to address expressly in the written agreement.  When the 
contingency materializes or the unaddressed terms become relevant and the parties find 
themselves in dispute resolution, courts and other decision-makers will resort to 
applicable law to supply terms the parties have not themselves supplied.121  For the 
Turkish practitioner who is counseling a client entering into a transaction with a U.S. 
counterparty, there are several reasonable possibilities as to the law that could be selected 
to fill the gaps left by the parties.  Among these are domestic sales law of the 
counterparty’s jurisdiction, Turkish domestic sales law, and the CISG.  With respect to 
transactions with U.S. contracting parties, it is therefore important to consider the 
differences and similarities between the CISG and Article 2 of the UCC, as two 
potentially applicable bodies of sales law, in order to make a good choice.122 
                                               
119 See id. § 1-103(b) (“Unless displaced by the particular provisions of [the Uniform Commercial Code], 
the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, 
principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, and other 
validating or invalidating cause supplement its provisions.”) (bracketed text in original). 
120 The State of Louisiana is unique among the fifty states in that Louisiana is a civil law jurisdiction, so it 
presents a host of differences from other states of the United States.  For that reason, U.S. practitioners 
outside of Louisiana tend to avoid choosing the laws of Louisiana to govern their clients’ transactions. 
121 For example, in Turkey the judge “is under a duty to apply Turkish choice-of-law rules and, sua sponte 
to determine which foreign law should be applied in accordance with these rules.”  Güngör, supra note x, at 
3 (citing MÖHUK Art. 2/1).  And the body of law to be applied “may govern the whole or a part of their 
contract.”  Id. at 6 (citing MÖHUK Art. 24/2).  Similarly, under U.S. domestic sales law the “contract” 
between the parties is defined to mean “the total legal obligation that results from the parties’ agreement as 
determined by [the Uniform Commercial Code] as supplemented by any other applicable laws.”  U.C.C. § 
1-201(12) (2011) (bracketed text in original). 
122 For the Turkish practitioner, it is also important to consider the differences between the CISG and 
Turkish sales law.  For a basic comparison of remedies under the CISG and remedies under Turkish law, 
see Cagdas Evrim Ergun, Comparative Study on the Buyer’s Remedies Under the 1980 Vienna Sales 
Convention and the Turkish Sales Law (2002), available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/ergun.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2011). 
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A. Similarities 
As some U.S. courts, as well as some commentators, have noted, there are 
analogous provisions between the CISG and Article 2 of the UCC.123  Indeed, the 
similarities between the CISG and the UCC contributed to the United States’ willingness 
to ratify the CISG.124  In its report on the CISG, the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations observed that “[the CISG] offers agreed substantive rules to govern the 
formation of international sales contracts and the rights and obligations of the buyer and 
seller that are in many respects similar to the concepts and approach of the U.S. Uniform 
Commercial Code.”125 
B. The Danger of Analogous Provisions 
Nevertheless, it is a mistake to assume that similar provisions should be treated 
the same.  This view on the similarities between the CISG and Article 2 of the UCC, 
whether correct or incorrect, has led to two harmful consequences relating to 
interpretation of the CISG. 
First, U.S. courts have not always looked carefully at the precise text of the CISG 
itself, which courts are required by international law to do,126 and which is a fundamental 
rule of statutory interpretation in the United States.  Instead of focusing first on the text of 
the treaty, U.S. courts have at times simply engaged in a UCC-like analysis of CISG 
provisions the court believes to be analogous to provisions of Article 2 of the UCC.127  
This seems to occur when no U.S. court has previously analyzed a CISG provision, and 
the CISG provision looks similar to the UCC provision. 
Second, focusing on UCC analysis of CISG provisions causes a U.S. court to fail 
to fulfill its responsibility under Article 7(1) to interpret the CISG with regard for its 
international character and “the need to promote uniformity in its application.”128  
Uniformity in the application of the CISG will only occur if courts across borders 
recognize their responsibility to consider how the CISG has been interpreted by courts in 
                                               
123 See, e.g., Schmitz-Werke GmbH & Co. v. Rockland Indus., Inc., 37 F. App’x 687, 691 (4th Cir. 2002); 
Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1028 (2d Cir. 1995); Hanwha Corp. v. Cedar 
Petrochems., Inc., No. 09 Civ. 10559(AKH), 2011 WL 165404, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2011); Raw 
Materials, Inc. v. Manfred Forberich GmbH & Co., No. 03 C 1154, 2004 WL 1535839, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. 
July 7, 2004); see also JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY, UNDERSTANDING THE CISG § 2.13 n.250 (3d ed. 2008). 
124 See, e.g., Letter of Submittal from George P. Schultz, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Ronald Reagan, President 
of the United States of Am. (Aug. 30, 1983), in S. Treaty Doc. No. 98-9, at vi (1983) (“It will be noted that 
the Convention embodies the substance of many of the important provisions of the UCC and is generally 
consistent with its approach and outlook.”). 
125 S. EXEC. REP. NO. 99-20, at 1 (1986). 
126 See Vienna Convention, supra note 62, art. 31 (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object 
and purpose.”) (emphasis added). 
127 See, e.g., Schmitz-Werke GmbH & Co., 37 F. App’x at 691; Raw Materials, Inc., 2004 WL 1535839 at 
*3-4. 
128 CISG, supra note 8, art. 7(1). 
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other jurisdictions.  Such recognition has happened only very little in the United States so 
far.129 
C. Important Differences 
Moreover, while the CISG arguably bears some resemblance to Article 2 of the 
UCC, it varies from Article 2 in some very important ways.130  For example, under 
Article 42 of the CISG the seller of the goods is deemed to give a warranty against 
infringement, similar to the warranty against infringement that a merchant seller is 
deemed to give under Section 2-312(3) of the UCC.  But the non-infringement warranty 
under the CISG is limited to third-party claims of which “the seller knew or could not 
have been unaware” at the time of the conclusion of the contract.131  Under the UCC, 
there is no knowledge requirement,132 making the potential scope of the seller’s 
obligations significantly greater under the UCC, and the potential scope of the buyer’s 
protection significantly less under the CISG, in respect of third-party infringement 
claims. 
1. The Role of the Writing and Determining Party Intent 
There are some provisions of the CISG that are quite clearly different from 
seemingly analogous provisions of the UCC, sometimes reflecting the influence of civil 
law jurisdictions, for example.  None represents a more important difference from the 
UCC than that of Article 8. 
To understand the importance of Article 8 and its departure from the U.S. legal 
tradition, it is helpful to begin with the role of the writing in the United States.  Section 2-
201 of the UCC contains the UCC statute of frauds, which establishes a writing 
requirement for contracts for the sale of goods for a price of $500 or more.133  Article 11 
of the CISG, on the other hand, specifically rejects any writing requirement or any other 
                                               
129 For an example of a U.S. court considering in its analysis the reasoning of a foreign court, see Chicago 
Prime Packers, Inc. v. Northam Food Trading Co., 320 F. Supp. 2d 702, 712-13 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
130 See, e.g., Miami Valley Paper, LLC v. Lebbing Eng’g & Consulting GmbH, No. 1:05-CV-00702, 2009 
WL 818618, at *4-*5 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2009). 
131 CISG, supra note 8, art. 42. 
132 See U.C.C. § 2-312(3) (2011). 
133 See U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (2011).  The common law also establishes a variety of statutes of frauds.  See 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 110 (1981).  At least one such statute of frauds could be relevant for a 
sale of goods transaction.  See id. § 130.  Notably, the UCC statute of frauds does not require the entire 
agreement to be in writing; it merely requires a writing, which need not even be accurate or complete: 
Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of goods for the price 
of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is some 
writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties 
and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or 
broker.  A writing is not insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed 
upon but the contract is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity of 
goods shown in such writing. 
U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (2011). 
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requirement as to form, providing that a contract “need not be concluded in or evidenced 
by writing” in order to be enforceable and may instead be proved by any means.134 
Similarly, in the United States when there is a written agreement, the “parol 
evidence rule” makes it difficult or impossible to introduce evidence of the parties’ intent 
from outside the four corners of that agreement.135  Under the parol evidence rule U.S. 
courts will give significant deference to a written agreement when the agreement is 
determined to be integrated. 
The approach under the CISG is different.  Specifically, courts are called upon to 
consider “all relevant circumstances of the case including the negotiations, any practices 
which the parties have established between themselves, usages and any subsequent 
conduct of the parties” to determine the parties’ intent.136  Thus, even when there is a 
written contract with contents that suggest a particular intent of the parties, the CISG 
requires courts to consider evidence that could show that the parties nevertheless actually 
intended something different from that indicated in the writing.  This is an exercise that is 
squarely outside the American legal imagination. 
These U.S. concepts, and the underlying emphasis on putting a final agreement in 
writing and deferring to that written agreement, are simply assumed by many U.S. 
practitioners and courts.  The CISG requires a different approach, reflecting a different 
legal philosophy that tells us, whether correctly or incorrectly, that written agreements 
should be viewed with some skepticism.  And if the parties’ actual intent – which may be 
contrary to the objective manifestation of intent evidenced by the writing – can be 
determined, then the actual intent prevails over a contrary objective intent under the 
CISG.  This is a difference of significance between the CISG and Article 2 of the UCC 
with respect to how a court will interpret the parties’ agreement. 
2. Battle of the Forms 
The failure of U.S. courts to conduct careful interpretation of CISG provisions in 
light of their context has led to misunderstanding regarding both similar and dissimilar 
provisions of the CISG.  The battle of the forms, which is addressed under the UCC in 
Section 2-207, provides an easy example of this.137  Section 2-207 of the UCC provides 
for a contract to form even when an apparent acceptance of an offer contains terms that 
are different from or in addition to the terms contained in the offer.138  This is a departure 
from the “mirror image rule” of the common law, which would automatically treat such a 
                                               
134 CISG, supra note 8, art. 11.  Article 29 of the CISG further demonstrates the CISG’s rejection of 
adherence to requirements as to form, in favor of considering extrinsic evidence, including conduct of the 
parties, when determining the terms of the parties’ agreement.  See id. art. 29.  Specifically, Article 29 
provides that even when a written contract contains a provision requiring any modification or termination 
by agreement to be in writing, “a party may be precluded by his conduct from asserting such a provision to 
the extent that the other party has relied on that conduct.”  Id. art. 29(2). 
135 See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 213 (1981); see also id. §§ 209 & 210; U.C.C. § 2-202 
(2011). 
136 See CISG, supra note 8, art. 8. 
137 See U.C.C. § 2-207 (2011). 
138 See id. § 2-207(1). 
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purported acceptance as a counteroffer, which would operate as a rejection of the offer 
and would be subject to acceptance before a contract would form.139 
Under the CISG the battle of the forms is addressed in Article 19.140  It is 
generally more difficult under Article 19 of the CISG than under Section 2-207 of the 
UCC for a contract to form when a purported acceptance of an offer contains additional 
or different terms, but it is marginally easier for a purported acceptance containing 
additional terms to constitute an acceptance under the CISG than under the common law.  
Yet, some U.S. courts have been unable to analyze formation under Article 19 without 
resorting to American concepts. 
With those distinctions between the two approaches in mind, a U.S. federal court, 
in Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich International Corp., reasoned that Article 19(1) of the 
CISG “reverses the rule of Uniform Commercial Code § 2-207, and reverts to the 
common law rule ….”141  That is simply not correct.  The CISG provisions dealing with 
the battle of the forms take an approach that is different from both Section 2-207 of the 
UCC and the mirror image rule of the common law.   
Article 19(1) of the CISG at first blush appears to adopt a rule that is the 
equivalent of the mirror image rule:  “A reply to an offer which purports to be an 
acceptance but contains additions, limitations or other modifications is a rejection of the 
offer and constitutes a counter-offer.”142  If the CISG battle of the forms analysis ended 
there, then the analysis would look very similar – perhaps equivalent – to the common 
law analysis under the mirror image rule.  But the CISG does not end there.  The next 
paragraph continues: 
However, a reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but 
contains additional or different terms which do not materially alter the 
terms of the offer constitutes an acceptance, unless the offeror, without 
undue delay, objects orally to the discrepancy or dispatches a notice to that 
effect.  If he does not so object, the terms of the contract are the terms of 
the offer with the modifications contained in the acceptance.143 
 
                                               
139 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 59 (1981) (“A reply to an offer which purports to accept it but 
is conditional on the offeror’s assent to terms additional to or different from those offered is not an 
acceptance but is a counteroffer.”). 
140 Article 19 provides in relevant part:   
(1)  A reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but contains additions, 
limitations or other modifications is a rejection of the offer and constitutes a counteroffer. 
 
(2)  However, a reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but contains 
additional or different terms which do not materially alter the terms of the offer 
constitutes an acceptance, unless the offeror, without undue delay, objects orally to the 
discrepancy or dispatches a notice to that effect.  If he does not so object, the terms of the 
contract are the terms of the offer with the modifications contained in the acceptance. 
CISG, supra note 8, art. 19. 
141 Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int’l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
142 CISG, supra note 8, art. 19(1). 
143 Id. art. 19(2). 
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Thus, a contract can form under the CISG on the exchange of documents that are 
not the mirror image of one another.  That concept is similar to the concept set forth in 
Section 2-207 of the UCC, but the language of Article 19 – and therefore the analysis that 
is necessary and appropriate under Article 19 – is different from (and generally less 
permissive than) the language of Section 2-207 of the UCC.   
Moreover, if a contract does not form by the exchange of documents but the 
parties behave as if there is a contract, then under Subsection (3) of Section 2-207 of the 
UCC, the contract is made up of the terms on which the writings of the parties agree (if 
any), together with supplementary terms under the UCC.144  That, too, is a departure from 
the common law, where the “last shot rule” provides that whoever fired the last shot (that 
is, sent the last offer) prior to performance typically wins the battle of the forms.  This is 
so because each counteroffer operates as a rejection of the previous offer.145  But at some 
point one party performs and the other party acquiesces in the performance, signaling that 
there is a contract between the parties.  In the ordinary case under the common law, the 
final counteroffer made – because it has not been rejected by a subsequent counteroffer – 
is deemed to have been accepted by performance.146  And the last shot that is fired would 
win the battle of the forms under the common law.  Subsection (3) of Section 2-207 of 
the UCC changes that result, rejecting the last shot rule of the common law. 
The CISG has no equivalent to Subsection (3) of Section 2-207 of the UCC, and it 
might be easy to reach the conclusion that the CISG therefore adopts the common law 
last shot rule.147  That, too, is not correct. 
There is provision in the CISG for acceptance by performance.148  But the 
provision identifies the limited circumstances when the offeree has the ability to indicate 
assent to the offer by performance of an act, and the ability to accept by performance 
under Article 18 exists only if it arises “by virtue of the offer or as a result of practices 
which the parties have established between themselves or of usage ….”149  And if those 
circumstances are not specifically present, then the last shot rule should not be used by a 
court to conclude that the final counteroffer automatically constitutes the agreement 
between the parties.  Rather, the court should use other applicable provisions of the 
CISG, including Article 8, to determine the intent of the parties, an exercise that does not 
have an exact corollary in the American legal tradition. 
3. Other Differences 
There are numerous other differences between the CISG and Article 2 of the 
UCC, including other rules of contract formation,150 the buyer’s right of rejection of 
                                               
144 U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (2011). 
145 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 39(2) (1981); see also id. § 36(1)(a). 
146 See id. § 50(2). 
147 See, e.g., Miami Valley Paper, LLC v. Lebbing Eng’g & Consulting GmbH, No. 1:05-CV-00702, 2009 
WL 818618, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2009). 
148 See CISG, supra note 8, art. 18(3). 
149 Id. 
150 Compare U.C.C. §§ 2-204, 2-206 & 2-207 (2011) and CISG, supra note 8, arts. 18 & 19. 
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nonconforming goods,151 and the remedies that are made available for breach, among 
other things. 
In addition to applying rules of treaty interpretation under international law, there 
are two fundamental things that are essential for courts to do.  First, courts must resist the 
temptation simply to apply domestic law analysis to provisions of the CISG that appear to 
the court to be analogous to provisions of domestic law.  Second, courts must consider 
how other courts in other jurisdictions have analyzed the CISG as one aspect of the 
court’s own analysis.  While courts are not bound by the decisions of foreign courts, 
considering the analysis of foreign courts can greatly help to facilitate uniformity – and 
therefore predictability – in the application of the CISG across borders. 
D. Acknowledging the Differences 
Ultimately, while the CISG resembles Article 2 of the UCC in some ways, the 
CISG actually varies from Article 2 of the UCC in some very important ways.  
Differences between the CISG and UCC Article 2 lead to different results, sometimes of 
critical importance.   
Fortunately, this simple truth has been recognized by some U.S. courts and 
commentators.152  In Miami Valley Paper, LLC v. Lebbing Engineering & Consulting 
GmbH, the court conducted a careful analysis of the CISG and its application to the facts 
of that case in its consideration of a motion for partial summary judgment brought by the 
plaintiff, a U.S. buyer, and a motion for summary judgment brought by the defendant, a 
German seller.153  The dispute arose out of the sale to the U.S. buyer by the German seller 
of a paper winding machine.154  Some of the issues before the court depended on the 
terms of the contract between the parties.155  However, the arrangement between the 
parties involved a battle of the forms, and the exchange of documents that created the 
                                               
151 Compare U.C.C. § 2-601 (2011) (requiring perfect tender by the seller or the buyer may reject the 
goods) and CISG, supra note 8, arts. 70, 72 & 73 (requiring “fundamental breach” before certain remedies 
are available to the buyer). 
152 See, e.g., Chateau des Charmes Wines Ltd. v. Sabaté USA Inc., 328 F.3d 528, 531 n.3 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(noting that the outcome under the CISG is different from the outcome that would likely have been 
appropriate under Article 2 of the UCC); Miami Valley Paper, LLC v. Lebbing Eng’g & Consulting 
GmbH, No. 1:05-CV-00702, 2009 WL 818618, at *4-5 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2009) (“There are several 
critical differences between the law governing contract formation under the CISG and the more familiar 
principles of the Uniform Commercial Code.”); Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int’l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 
1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (recognizing that the CISG “varies from the Uniform Commercial Code in many 
significant ways.”); Louis F. Del Duca & Patrick Del Duca, Selected Topics Under the Convention on 
International Sale of Goods (CISG), 106 DICK. L. REV. 205, 207 (2001); see also Barbara Berry, S.A. de 
C.V. v. Ken M. Spooner Farms, Inc., 254 F. App’x 646, 647 (9th Cir. 2007) (reversing district court’s grant 
of summary judgment when the district court erred in failing to first analyze under the CISG the formation 
of the underlying contract). 
153 Miami Valley Paper, LLC v. Lebbing Eng’g & Consulting GmbH, No. 1:05-CV-00702, 2009 WL 
818618, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2009). 
154 Id. at *1-*2. 
155 Id. at *5-*8. 
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battle of the forms therefore affected the formation of the contract between the parties 
and, accordingly, its terms.156 
In resolving the parties’ cross-motions, the court noted three specific differences 
in respect of contract formation between the CISG and the UCC.157  First, the court 
correctly recognized a difference with respect to the battle of the forms, though it 
incorrectly characterized the difference, finding that, unlike the UCC, which has 
abrogated the mirror image rule under Section 2-207, the CISG applies the mirror image 
rule.158  Regrettably, the court failed to note that Article 19 of the CISG varies from the 
common law mirror image rule, as discussed in Part x, supra.159  Second, the court noted 
that the CISG has no statute of frauds.160  Third, the court noted that the CISG contains 
no parol evidence rule and instead allows the court to consider statements or conduct to 
establish, modify, or alter the terms of a contract.161  Thus, some U.S. courts have 
recognized that the CISG is different from Article 2 of the UCC, and the analysis 
required under the CISG is therefore also different. 
E. Different Provisions – Different Outcomes 
For courts and decision-makers, what is at stake?  In addition to the clear problem 
of failure to comply with requirements of international law, there is the practical 
consideration that importing a domestic sales law analysis can lead to serious 
consequences for one of the parties to a contract dispute governed by the CISG.  One 
poignant example of this is offered by Beijing Metals & Minerals Import/Export Corp. v. 
Am. Bus. Ctr., Inc., a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.162   
Beijing Metals & Minerals Import/Export Corp. (Beijing Metals) entered into a 
business relationship with American Business Center, Inc. (ABC) for development of the 
fitness equipment market in the United States and Canada.163  Beijing Metals agreed to 
manufacture goods for ABC to specification and in accordance with other 
requirements.164  Initially, ABC paid in advance for each shipment.165  Eventually, the 
parties changed the payment terms to 90-day payment terms, and ABC subsequently 
defaulted on its payment obligations.166  ABC and Beijing Metals agreed on a payment 
plan, and in their written payment plan agreement, which the parties signed, ABC 
acknowledged amounts owed and the parties established a payment schedule.167   
                                               
156 Id. at *1-*2. 
157 Id. at *4-*5. 
158 Id. at *4 (citing Article 19 of the CISG). 
159 See id. 
160 See id. at *5. 
161 Id. 
162 993 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1993) 
163 See id. at 1179. 
164 See id. at 1180. 
165 See id. 
166 See id. 
167 See id. 
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However, ABC asserted that there were also two oral agreements entered into 
concurrently with the written payment plan.168  Specifically, ABC claimed that Beijing 
Metals also agreed that Beijing Metals, first, would ship goods to compensate for 
nonconforming and defective goods and shortages, and second, would begin making 
shipments on 90-day payment terms.169  Subsequently, the parties exchanged letters that 
arguably offered evidence of those oral agreements.170 
ABC eventually refused to make payments in accordance with the payment 
schedule established by the payment agreement, and Beijing Metals filed a claim to 
recover the amounts described in the payment agreement.171  ABC raised the defense that 
its payment obligations under the payment agreement were only one part of a three-part 
understanding, the other two parts consisting of the two claimed oral agreements, and 
ABC further claimed that Beijing Metals was in breach of its obligations under the two 
oral agreements.172  But the district court refused to allow evidence of the two claimed 
oral agreements, concluding that the parol evidence rule prevented admission of evidence 
of those agreements, thereby preventing the claimed oral agreements from being a 
defense to ABC’s payment obligations under the payment agreement.173 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit applied the parol evidence rule under Texas common 
law.174  ABC argued for application of the CISG, while Beijing Metals argued for 
(domestic) Texas law.175  The Fifth Circuit reasoned that it was not necessary to resolve 
the choice-of-law issue, because the parol evidence rule of the Texas common law 
“applies regardless.”176 
Because the agreement at issue could reasonably be characterized simply as a 
settlement agreement and not a contract of sale of goods for purposes of the CISG, it is 
possible that a court could reasonably conclude that the CISG did not apply to the dispute 
concerning nonpayment under the payment agreement.  On the other hand, a court could 
conclude that the payment agreement was one aspect of a larger sale of goods contract 
that fell within the sphere of application of the CISG.  If a court were to so conclude, then 
the Fifth Circuit’s statement that the parol evidence rule “applies regardless” is incorrect, 
as discussed in Part x, supra.177 
In this case, there was evidence tending to show that the claimed oral agreements 
actually had been entered into by the parties.178  Such evidence included testimony of 
ABC executives regarding the negotiations, a letter sent by Beijing Metals to ABC 
following the negotiations, and two letters sent by ABC to Beijing Metals following the 
                                               
168 See id. 
169 See id. 
170 See id. at 1180-81, n.5, n.6 & n.7. 
171 See id. at 1181. 
172 See id. at 1182. 
173 See id. 
174 See id. at 1182-83. 
175 See id. at 1182 n.9. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
178 See id. at 1180-81, n.5, n.6 & n.7. 
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negotiations.179  That evidence clearly would have been admissible under the CISG.180  
Indeed, the court would have been required under Article 8(3) to give all of the evidence 
“due consideration.”181 
Under the parol evidence rule of Texas common law, the evidence was 
excluded.182  But under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution,183 Article 8(3) of 
the CISG, when applicable, prevails over the parol evidence rule of Texas common law, 
and the parol evidence rule therefore would not have applied ‘regardless,’ as asserted by 
the court.  Unfortunately, the Fifth Circuit failed to recognize that and, as a consequence, 
failed to engage in the analysis necessary to determine whether the dispute arose from a 
mere settlement agreement that did not constitute a contract for the sale of goods for 
purposes of the CISG or, instead, arose from one part of a contract of sale of goods, 
making the CISG relevant for the analysis.184 
VI. ESTABLISHING CONTRACT TERMS BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT 
Fortunately for Turkish and U.S. parties to sales transactions, one important 
similarity between the CISG and the UCC is that both establish a broad freedom of 
contract.  With some important exceptions, parties are free to define for themselves their 
contractual rights and duties and the terms of their contractual relationship.  This is 
especially important in the context of international business transactions, where the 
parties are likely to encounter a complex web of local, national, foreign, and international 
laws and regulations. 
A. The Benefit of a Writing 
In modern commercial transactions, the parties do not always take the time to 
reduce to an integrated writing the terms of their agreement.  The speed of a time-
sensitive transaction may make it impractical; the value of a low-value transaction may 
make it cost ineffective; and the desire to preserve a perception of mutual trust may cause 
some contracting parties to prefer a less formal arrangement. 
Some transactions, on the other hand, more clearly justify the time and cost 
necessary to finalize a written agreement that is mutually agreeable.  This might be due to 
the uncertainty surrounding the counterparty’s ability or willingness to perform; it could 
                                               
179 See id. 
180 See CISG, supra note 8, art.8(3); see also id. art 9(1). 
181 Id. art. 8(3). 
182 See 993 F.2d at 1182-83. 
183 U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
184 The court did reject by footnote an argument that the parol evidence rule of Article 2 of the UCC, rather 
than the parol evidence rule of the Texas common law, was the appropriate parol evidence rule to apply.  
See 993 F.2d at 1183 n.3.  But it did so by conclusorily stating that the court would apply the parol 
evidence rule developed by Texas common law “[b]ecause the [payment] agreement, on its face, is limited 
to a payment schedule for overdue invoices, and more closely resembles a settlement agreement, as 
opposed to a sale of goods.”  Id.  And the court engaged in no analysis to show that its conclusion was 
sound. 
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be due to a high-risk good constituting part of the transaction; it could be due to the value 
of the transaction.  
One clear justification for taking the time to enter into a written agreement is 
when a sale of goods transaction is international, that is, when the buyer and seller have 
their respective places of business in different countries.  When that is the situation, then 
the potential for risk and uncertainly increases exponentially due to the myriad of laws 
that become relevant or potentially relevant for the transaction.  One way that parties can 
reduce uncertainty and allocate risk in a way that is sensible for that particular transaction 
is by taking the time to enter into a robust written agreement. 
B. The UCC Freedom of Contract and its Limits 
The freedom of contract appears to be a familiar concept in Turkey, where parties 
to international contracts generally have the freedom to choose the law that will govern 
their contract, and where transactions are upheld whenever possible.185  Similarly, the 
United States has a reputation as a jurisdiction where contracting parties enjoy a broad 
freedom of contract.  And in fact, Article 1 of the UCC specifically provides that “the 
effect of provisions of [the Uniform Commercial Code] may be varied by agreement.”186  
The freedom of contract in the United States is not absolute, however.  In fact, this is 
made clear in the freedom of contract clause itself, which begins with the qualifier, 
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided ….”187 
1. Non-Derogable Provisions 
Notably, the UCC’s obligations of “good faith, diligence, reasonableness, and 
care” may not be disclaimed by agreement.188  Even so, the parties are permitted to 
establish the standards by which performance of those obligations is to be measured, as 
long as the standards the parties establish are not “manifestly unreasonable.”189 
Similarly, notwithstanding the freedom of contract, some provisions of Article 2 
are more difficult than others to vary.  The most important examples arise in the context 
of the seller attempting to place limits on the seller’s potential liability by means of 
exclusions of warranties or disclaimers of damages. 
                                               
185 See Güngör, supra note 98, at 6 (citing MÖHUK arts. 7 & 24/2). 
186 U.C.C. § 1-302(a) (2011) (brackets in original).  Although Article 2 of the UCC is the article that applies 
to sale of goods transactions, Article 1 of the UCC also applies to a transaction, to the extent the transaction 
is governed by any other article of the UCC, including Article 2.  See id. § 1-102. 
187 Id. § 1-302(a). 
188 Id. § 1-302(b). 
189 Id. 
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2. Implied Warranties 
Article 2 of the UCC establishes three implied warranties relating to the quality of 
the goods sold, and the implied warranties may not be excluded by simple means.190  The 
implied warranty of merchantability, for example, is implied in all contracts for the sale 
of goods when the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.191  That means 
that merchant sellers are deemed to have promised by contract that their goods are 
merchantable.  In order to be merchantable, goods must at least satisfy a list of 
requirements, including that the goods must pass without objection in the trade under the 
contract description, be fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used, and, 
in the case of fungible goods, be of fair average quality within the description (among 
other things).192  The list is non-exhaustive, and other attributes of merchantability could 
arise by virtue of usage of trade or through case law.193   
From the seller’s perspective, it is plain to see that inclusion of the implied 
warranty of merchantability in a contract for the sale of goods could open the door to 
potential liability for breach of warranty even when the goods conform to agreed-upon 
specifications and are free from defects in material and workmanship, if the buyer can 
persuade the decision-maker that the goods are nevertheless not merchantable for some 
reason.  Consequently, U.S. sellers tend to attempt to disclaim the implied warranty of 
merchantability in order to reduce risk exposure and to increase certainty. 
In fact, the implied warranty of merchantability may be excluded by contract, but 
exclusion requires specific steps.194  If those steps are not followed, then the warranty has 
not been excluded, no matter the freedom of contract. 
Similarly, the UCC establishes an implied warranty that goods will be fit for a 
buyer’s particular purpose for the goods, when the seller has reason to know the 
particular purpose and also has reason to know that the buyer is relying on the seller’s 
skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods.195  The particular purpose for the 
goods differs from the ordinary purpose for the goods “in that it envisions a specific use 
                                               
190 The UCC implied warranties are (1) the implied warranty of merchantability, U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (2011), 
(2) the implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose, id. § 2-315, and (3) implied warranties arising 
from course of dealing or usage of trade, id. § 2-314(3). 
191 U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (2011).  The UCC defines the term “Merchant” as follows: 
“Merchant” means a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his 
occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or 
goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed 
by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation 
holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill. 
Id. § 2-104(1). 
192 See id. § 2-314(2). 
193 See id. § 2-314 official cmt. 6. 
194 There are two ways to exclude by contractual agreement the UCC implied warranty of merchantability.  
First, “to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must 
mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous ….”  Id. § 2-316(2).  Second, all 
implied warranties, including the implied warranty of merchantability, are excluded by expressions like ‘as 
is’, ‘with all faults’ or other similar language.  Id. § 2-316(3)(a). 
195 Id. § 2-315. 
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by the buyer which is peculiar to the nature of his business ….”196  Thus, a seller might 
furnish goods that are perfectly suitable for their ordinary purposes and nevertheless face 
a claim for breach of warranty, if the buyer can show that the implied warranty of fitness 
for particular purpose was made and breached.  As a consequence, sellers tend to attempt 
to exclude the implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose as well. 
In fact, the implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose may be excluded by 
contract as well, but exclusion requires specific steps.197  And, like the implied warranty 
of merchantability, if the steps are not followed, then the warranty is not excluded by 
contract. 
3. Express Warranties 
In addition to implied warranties, the UCC also provides for express 
warranties.198  Express warranties can arise from promises made by the seller to the buyer 
that relate to the goods, affirmations of fact made by the seller to the buyer that relate to 
the goods, descriptions of the goods, and samples or models of the goods, in each case, 
when made part of the basis of the bargain.199  Once made, an express warranty cannot be 
disclaimed.200  Of course, an express warranty made as part of a negotiation could be 
bargained away prior to finalization of the agreement.  But if not bargained away, then 
Section 2-316(1) of the UCC provides that when both an express warranty and a 
purported disclaimer of the express warranty are part of the agreement between the 
parties and the two terms cannot be reconciled, the express warranty will prevail over the 
purported disclaimer.201  However, if the express warranty was made separate from an 
integrated writing, then the buyer has the practical difficulty of overcoming the parol 
evidence rule in order to prove that the express warranty was made, an unlikely – if not 
impossible – prospect.202 
4. Warranty of Title 
Finally, the UCC also establishes a warranty of title, a warranty that is especially 
difficult to modify or exclude.203  A general disclaimer of implied warranties will not 
                                               
196 Id. § 2-315 official cmt. 2. 
197 There are two ways to exclude by contractual agreement the UCC implied warranty of fitness for 
particular purpose.  First, “to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a 
writing and conspicuous.”  Id. § 2-316(2).  Second, all implied warranties, including the implied warranty 
of fitness for particular purpose, are excluded by expressions like ‘as is’, ‘with all faults’ or other similar 
language.  Id. § 2-316(3)(a). 
198 Id. § 2-313. 
199 Id. § 2-313(1). 
200 See id. § 2-316(1). 
201 See id. 
202 See id.; see also id. § 2-202. 
203 Article 2 of the UCC establishes the following warranty of title: 
Subject to subsection (2) there is in a contract for sale a warranty by the seller that (a) the 
title conveyed shall be good, and its transfer rightful; and (b) the goods shall be delivered 
free from any security interest or other lien or encumbrance of which the buyer at the 
time of contracting has no knowledge. 
U.C.C. § 2-312(1) (2011). 
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disclaim the warranty of title, and even an “as is, with all faults” clause will not disclaim 
the warranty of title under ordinary circumstances.204  Rather, exclusion of the warranty 
of title occurs only by two possible means: 
A warranty [of title] will be excluded or modified only by specific 
language or by circumstances which give the buyer reason to know that 
the person selling does not claim title in himself or that he is purporting to 
sell only such right or title as he or a third person may have.205 
 
Thus, to disclaim the warranty of title requires either “specific language” or 
existence of the rather limited circumstances that specifically give the buyer reason to 
know that the person selling does not claim title.206  Such limited circumstances include 
“sales by sheriffs, executors, certain foreclosing lienors and persons similarly situated” 
when made out of the ordinary commercial course in a way that makes their peculiar 
character immediately apparent to the buyer.207 
5. Disclaiming Damages 
One common method used by U.S. sellers to limit potential liability is by 
disclaiming certain categories of damages.  The UCC specifically provides for recovery 
by an aggrieved buyer of not only direct damages, but also incidental damages and 
consequential damages.208  Such damages can be quite large, when an aggrieved buyer 
claims lost profits, for example.209  As a consequence, U.S. sellers frequently disclaim 
both categories of damages, and the UCC provides for such disclaimer.210  But the 
seller’s freedom to disclaim consequential damages is another example of a freedom that 
is not absolute under the UCC.211  Specifically, while the seller may disclaim 
consequential damages as a general rule, such a disclaimer is not effective if the 
purported limitation or exclusion is unconscionable.212  And any purported limitation of 
consequential damages for personal injury in the case of consumer goods is prima facie 
unconscionable.213 
                                               
204 See id. § 2-312 official cmt. 6 (“The warranty [of title] is not designated as an ‘implied’ warranty, and 
hence is not subject to Section 2-316(3).  Disclaimer of the warranty of title is governed instead by 
subsection (2) [of Section 2-312], which requires either specific language or the described 
circumstances.”). 
205 Id. § 2-312(2) (emphasis added). 
206 See id. 
207 Id. official cmt. 5. 
208 See id. §§ 2-712(2), 2-713(1), & 2-714(3). 
209 See id. § 2-715.  Incidental damages can include “expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, 
transportation and care and custody of goods rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges, 
expenses or commissions in connection with effecting cover and any other reasonable expense incident to 
the delay or other breach.”  Id. § 2-715(1).  Consequential damages can include any foreseeable loss 
resulting from the seller’s breach, as well as any “injury to person or property proximately resulting from 
any breach of warranty,” whether foreseeable or not.  Id. § 2-715(2). 
210 See id. § 2-719(1)(a). 
211 See id. § 2-719(3). 
212 Id. 
213 Id. 
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Each of these permitted limitations on the seller’s liability or potential liability 
may be accomplished by express clauses in the parties’ agreement, but only if the 
statutory requirements are satisfied.  If the statutory requirements are not satisfied, then, 
notwithstanding the freedom of contract and the actual intent of the parties, a court is 
likely to conclude that the clauses are simply ineffective. 
C. Freedom of Contract under the CISG 
Like the UCC, the CISG explicitly establishes a broad freedom of contract, a 
point that was not lost on the United States.  In transmitting the CISG to the U.S. Senate 
for its advice and consent following U.S. signature of the CISG, President Ronald Reagan 
noted that, “[w]orthy of emphasis is the international deference that the Convention 
accords to the contract made by the parties to an international sale.  The parties may 
agree that domestic law rather than the Convention will apply, and their contract may 
modify or supplant the Convention’s rules.”214  Indeed, Article 6 of the CISG provides 
that the parties to any contract governed by the CISG may, subject to Article 12, 
“derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions.”215   
Unlike the UCC’s broad categories of non-derogable terms of good faith, 
reasonableness, and the like, the CISG’s non-derogable provisions are quite limited.  
Specifically, Article 12 establishes the fundamental non-derogable terms of the CISG: 
Any provision of article 11,216 article 29217 or Part II218 of this Convention 
that allows a contract of sale or its modification or termination by 
agreement or any offer, acceptance or other indication of intention to be 
made in any form other than in writing does not apply where any party has 
his place of business in a Contracting State which has made a declaration 
under article 96 of this Convention.219  The parties may not derogate from 
or vary the effect of this article.220 
 
Neither Turkey nor the United States has made a declaration under Article 96,221 
so the fundamental non-derogable provision of the CISG is not even applicable for sales 
                                               
214 Letter of Transmittal, supra note 58, at iii. 
215 CISG, supra note 8, art. 6 (emphasis added). 
216 “A contract of sale need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing and is not subject to any other 
requirement as to form.  It may be proved by any means, including witnesses.”  Id. art. 11. 
217 Article 29(1) provides that “[a] contract may be modified or terminated by the mere agreement of the 
parties.”  Id. art. 29(1).  Paragraph (2) of Article 29 continues: 
A contract in writing which contains a provision requiring any modification or 
termination by agreement to be in writing may not be otherwise modified or terminated 
by agreement.  However, a party may be precluded by his conduct from asserting such a 
provision to the extent that the other party has relied on that conduct. 
Id. art. 29(2). 
218 Part II of the CISG is concerned with formation of the contract.  See id. pt. II. 
219 Article 96 allows Contracting States to declare that domestic writing requirements, such as a domestic 
statute of frauds, will be effective, notwithstanding the terms of the CISG that reject writing requirements.  
See id. 
220 Id. art. 12. 
221 See CISG Status, supra note 40. 
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transactions between Turkish and U.S. contracting parties.  Thus, the CISG offers the 
parties great freedom of contract. 
Moreover, the CISG simply does not contain the same hurdles to modification of 
certain important terms, such as warranty terms, that the UCC contains.  On the contrary, 
in the warranty provisions of the CISG, the CISG expressly contemplates modification by 
the parties without establishing any particular means of modification:  “Except where the 
parties have agreed otherwise, the goods do not conform to the contract unless they 
[satisfy the list of requirements established by Article 35].”222 
Now, if the parties draft their written agreement carefully and are mindful of the 
hurdles created by domestic sales law, such as the relevant provisions of the UCC, then 
the same effect can be achieved under U.S. domestic sales law (with respect to exclusion 
of warranties under Article 2 of the UCC, for example) as can be achieved under Article 
6 (and Article 35(2)) of the CISG.  But varying the provisions of applicable law is less 
complicated under the CISG, and there is generally less risk of an ineffective disclaimer 
or an unenforceable term under the CISG than under the UCC.223 
D. The Risk of Invalidity under the UCC 
In addition to the risk that a contract clause might be deemed to be ineffective 
because it fails to follow a prescribed formula or otherwise to satisfy a statutory 
requirement, there is a distinct parallel risk under the UCC that some allocations of risk 
or assignments of responsibility might be deemed simply to be invalid, usually because of 
the circumstances under which the contract was entered into.  There are essentially two 
ways that a contract, or an agreed-upon contract clause, can be rendered unenforceable by 
a court under Article 2 of the UCC:  if it is deemed by the court to be unconscionable, or 
if an equitable principle renders it invalid. 
1. Unconscionability 
With respect to the doctrine of unconscionability, Article 2 of the UCC provides 
as follows: 
                                               
222 CISG, supra note 8, art. 35(2). 
223 For a contrary view, see LOOKOFSKY, supra note 123, 165 (“The validity (enforceability) of a standard 
term which (e.g.) purports to disclaim the obligations set forth in Article 35(2) and/or limit liability in the 
event of breach is a question outside the CISG: the Convention is simply ‘not concerned with’ the validity 
of clauses like these.”).  This view of the CISG is not supported by its text.  It is true that the CISG is not 
concerned with the validity of the contract or of any of the contract’s provisions.  See CISG, supra note 8, 
art. 4.  But that is so with respect to the validity of any clause in the contract; there is no special treatment 
accorded to clauses purporting to limit either party’s liability.  Indeed, the CISG contemplates in other 
sections of the CISG that a contract could include such a clause.  See, e.g., id. art. 19(3) (addressing how a 
contract term relating to the “extent of one party’s liability to the other” should be analyzed in the battle of 
the forms).  The explanatory note supports this as well:  “[W]hen a question concerning a matter governed 
by this Convention is not expressly settled in it, the question is to be settled in conformity with the general 
principles on which the Convention is based.  Only in the absence of such principles should the matter be 
settled in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law.”  Id., 
Explanatory Note, ¶ 14. 
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If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the 
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court 
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the 
contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the 
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable 
result.224 
 
In practice, a finding of unconscionability is rare, especially in a business 
transaction that does not involve a consumer buyer.  Some courts require a finding of 
both procedural and substantive unconscionability for unconscionability to be found.225  
And regardless, the various standards used by U.S. courts in different jurisdictions tend to 
be quite high.226 
Nevertheless, it is important to be aware that the doctrine exists under the UCC, 
which leaves the door open for a court to refuse to enforce a contract clause that was 
agreed upon by the parties, but that one party comes to regret, if the regretful party can 
persuade the court that the clause is unconscionable. 
2. Equitable Principles of Invalidity 
Second, the UCC expressly incorporates supplementary equitable principles 
pertaining to validity and invalidity, to the extent not displaced by particular provisions of 
the UCC: 
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of the [Uniform Commercial 
Code], the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and 
the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, 
fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, and other 
validating or invalidating cause supplement its provisions.227 
 
Thus, the UCC specifically contemplates the possibility of invalidation of a 
contract, in whole or in part, under the doctrine of unconscionability, as well as under 
traditional equitable principles of invalidity, such as fraud. 
E. Invalidity and the CISG 
The CISG by contrast does not itself expressly provide for the possibility of 
invalidation of a contract, in whole or in part, under the doctrine of unconscionability or 
any other principle.  This makes sense, at least to some extent, because the CISG does not 
apply to consumer transactions.  That is, the CISG excludes from its sphere of application 
                                               
224 U.C.C. § 2-302(1). 
225 See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture, 350 F.2d 445, 449-50 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
226 See, e.g., BMW Fin. Servs. V. Smoke Rise Corp., 486 S.E.2d 629, 630 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (ruling in 
the context of a lease transaction that unconscionability is evaluated by “determining whether … the 
agreement is one which no sane man not operating under a delusion would make and … no honest man 
would take advantage of.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
227 U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (2011) (bracketed text in original). 
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contracts for the sale of goods “bought for personal, family or household use,” unless the 
seller did not know and ought not to have known the goods were purchased for the 
personal, family or household use.228  Article 2 of the UCC, on the other hand, applies to 
all sales of goods, including sales of goods to consumer buyers, and no matter the use for 
which the goods are purchased.229  Because the CISG applies by its terms only to non-
consumer goods transactions, there is less need for paternalistic interference in the 
bargain struck by the parties.230 
On the other hand, the CISG provides that “it is not concerned with (a) the 
validity of the contract or any of its provisions ….”231  And the CISG further provides for 
questions concerning matters not settled by the CISG to be settled by the law applicable 
by virtue of the rules of private international law.232  That could allow principles of 
domestic law relating to the validity of the contract or any of its provisions, such as the 
doctrine of fraud, to supplement the CISG.   
Still, any such domestic doctrine of invalidity should be applied (if at all) only 
after the applicable provisions of the CISG, including Articles 6, 8 and 9, among others, 
have been considered and applied.  But if a case for fraud can be made, then the CISG 
would not prevent a court from concluding that the contract is invalid, nor should it. 
F. Balancing Freedom of Contract and Finality of the Writing 
In short, both the CISG and the UCC afford the parties a very broad freedom of 
contract.  The UCC creates some hurdles that must be cleared for effectiveness of certain 
clauses, especially those that purport to limit the seller’s potential liability.  But the 
attentive practitioner can clear those hurdles by means of careful drafting, and in such a 
case, the statutory requirements under the UCC that must be satisfied in order to take 
advantage of the freedom of contract should not matter all that much. 
On the other hand, there is greater risk under the CISG that the writing – 
including a writing that has been carefully drafted by both parties – will be disregarded in 
favor of some subjective intent, if one party is able to show to the court’s satisfaction that 
the claimed subjective intent was shared by the parties.  When a written agreement is well 
drafted and complete, that aspect of the CISG should not play a significant role, as the 
written agreement itself ought to offer the very best evidence of the parties’ mutual 
subjective intent.  But the risk (or opportunity, depending on the perspective of the party) 
exists nevertheless. 
At the same time, while a Turkish commercial lawyer who values the certainty 
offered by a robust written agreement might legitimately be concerned about the 
                                               
228 CISG, supra note 8, art. 2(a). 
229 See U.C.C. § 2-102 (scope of application) and § 2-105 (definition of “goods”) (2011).   
230 For an alternative viewpoint, see Michael B. Lopez, Resurrecting the Public Good: Amending the 
Validity Exception in the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods for 
the 21st Century, 10 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 133 (2010). 
231 CISG, supra note 8, art. 4. 
232 See id. art. 7(2). 
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uncertainty presented by Article 8 of the CISG, the ability to introduce extrinsic evidence 
under the CISG could cut in favor of a Turkish contracting party, especially when the 
memory of the U.S. contracting party is faulty.  For example, if the parties use the U.S. 
contracting party’s standard form as part of their written agreement and the standard form 
does not represent in a complete way the agreed-upon terms, then the CISG will 
generally allow the Turkish contracting party a better chance of showing that the form is 
inaccurate or incomplete, and that the parties actually shared some different intent.   
All of the foregoing shows that a careful decision as to choice of law should be 
made for each international sales transaction that a Turkish buyer or seller enters into, a 
decision that should be based on the facts and circumstances of that transaction. 
CONCLUSION 
“Turkey is a democratic, secular, unitary, constitutional republic, with an ancient 
cultural heritage …”233 and is an important friend to and trading partner with the United 
States.  Even without a common legal framework in place, trade in goods between the 
two countries has been robust.  Now that Turkey is a party to the CISG, predictability in 
the context of sales of goods should increase and transaction costs should decrease. 
Moreover, Turkey’s accession to the CISG is an important step toward ongoing 
harmonization of Turkey’s laws relating to international trade and its integration into the 
international system of trade and commerce.  It is an important contribution to the goal of 
removal of legal barriers to trade and promotion of the ongoing development of trade. 
But accession is only the first step Turkey must take in order to fully realize the 
benefits of becoming a party to the CISG.  Three additional things must occur for 
Turkey’s accession to be meaningful and to bear fruit. 
First, the Turkish bar must become familiar with the CISG and must become 
familiar with the differences between the CISG, on the one hand, and Turkish domestic 
sales law or other domestic sales laws, such as the United States’ UCC, on the other 
hand.  Only by becoming familiar with the CISG and the differences it offers will the 
Turkish bar be in a position to render thoughtful and effective advice regarding whether 
or not to exclude the CISG on a case-by-case basis. 
Second, the Turkish bench and other decision-makers, such as arbitrators, must 
interpret and apply the CISG faithfully.  Not only are Turkish courts required to do so by 
international law, but it is essential that they – and U.S. courts, for that matter – do so, to 
make their respective contributions to the continuing development of the legal framework 
necessary to facilitate efficient, predictable, and mutually beneficial trade and commerce. 
Third, Turkish law schools must play their part in facilitating understanding of the 
CISG by preparing tomorrow’s members of the bar to give their clients good advice and 
by preparing tomorrow’s members of the bench to render good decisions, thus propelling 
                                               
233 H.R. RES. 103, 112th Cong. (2011). 
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Turkey steadfastly along its path of meaningful engagement with the international system 
of trade and commerce. 
